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InstitutionsIn a context of widespread concern about budget deﬁcits, it is important to assess whether public sector pay is in
linewith the private sector. Our paper proposes an estimation of differences in lifetime values of employment be-
tween public and private sectors for ﬁve European countries.We use data from the European Community House-
hold Panel over the period 1994–2001 for Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain. We look at lifetime
values instead of wage levels because, as we show in our results, differences in earnings mobility, earnings vola-
tility and job loss risk across sectors occur inmany instances and thesewill matter to forward-looking individuals.
When aggregated into a measure of lifetime value of employment in either sector, these differences yield esti-
mates of the lifetime premium in the public sector for these ﬁve countries. We also present differences in the in-
stitutional and labour market structures in these countries and ﬁnd that countries for which we estimate a
positive lifetime premium in the public sector, i.e. France and Spain, are also the countries where access to the
public sector requires costly entry procedures. This paper is to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst to use this
dynamic approach applied to Europe, which we are able to do with a common dataset, time-period and model.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).and the editor for their helpful
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The public sector wage bill accounts for about a ﬁfth of government
spending across most European countries.1 In a context of widespread
concern about budget deﬁcits and policies implemented to reduce the
size of government expenditure, it is important to assess whether public1 See Section 3.1 for detailed ﬁgures.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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tions between the public and the private sector matter for several rea-
sons: the public sector wage bill being paid out of taxpayers' money
makes it a politically sensitive issue; public sector pay being to
some extent insulated from market forces may drive a wedge between
public and private remunerations and increase inequality; ﬁnally, were
public sector pay to become relatively unattractive, recruitment and re-
tention in the public sectorworkforcewould becomedifﬁcult. Our paper
proposes an estimation of differences in lifetime values of employment
between public and private sectors for ﬁve European countries.
We show that the comparison of lifetime values instead of wage
levels is relevant because dynamic differences in earnings mobility,
earnings volatility and job loss risk across sectors occur in many
instances and these will matter to forward-looking individuals. Whilst
a large body of literature has examined differences across sectors in
terms of pay levels or pension systems (see Emmerson and Jin (2012)
for a recent contribution), very little attention has been given to the
comparison of lifetime values aggregating the various dimensions of
differences into a single measure relevant to individual sector choice.
Moreover, we document differences in institutional settings regarding
public sector pay, progression, employment and pension systems across
the countries we study and ﬁnd interesting correlations between
barriers to entry into public sector jobs and lifetime premia. Whilst it
is beyond the scope of this paper to propose and estimate a theoretical
mechanism linking institutions and lifetime premia, we claim that the
cross-country comparison that we carried out is a useful step for future
research aiming to model the existence of a (partial) equilibrium
lifetime premium as a result of sector-speciﬁc institutions.
In terms of method, we use the estimation strategy proposed in
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) to estimate jointly the four components
of the public–private “premium”, namely: levels, mobility and volatility
of earnings and job loss risk whilst controlling for selection between
sectors according to observed and unobserved characteristics. We use
data from the European Community Household Panel over the period
1994–2001 for Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain.3 We
ﬁnd evidence ofmarked differences between the public and private sec-
tors with regard to earnings mobility, earnings volatility and job loss
risk, as well as earnings levels. When aggregated into a measure of life-
time value of employment in either sector, these differences yield esti-
mates of the lifetime premium in the public sector for these ﬁve
countries. In order to put these differences into their institutional con-
text, we also present differences in the institutional and labour market
structures in these countries that may translate into the dynamic differ-
ences that we estimate. This paper is to the best of our knowledge the
ﬁrst to use this dynamic approach applied to Europe, which we are
able to do with a common dataset, time-period and model.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarised as follows. We ﬁnd substan-
tial cross-country disparities in lifetime public premia as well as
differences in institutional settings with respect to public sector re-
cruitment and pay determination. We show evidence of signiﬁcant
unobserved heterogeneity, both in terms of labour market mobility
and earnings levels and dynamics. After controlling for selection, sizable
differences are found in the following dimensions and countries: cross-
sectional incomes are 11 log-points higher in the public sector than in
the private sector in Spain, 3 log-points higher in France and 4 log-
points higher in Italy. The dispersion of public sector incomes is sub-
stantially lower than their private sector equivalent in the Netherlands
and Spain, whilst public sector incomes are more persistent in Italy.
Returns to experience are higher in the public sector in Germany but2 See for example Giordano et al. (2011) and Glassner (2010) for recent European re-
ports on public sector pay.
3 More on why these countries and no others were used in Section 4 below. The focus
on a “pre-crisis” period allows us to assess the differences of interest before various poli-
cies were put in place to alter one dimension or another of public–private differences in
pay, employment and pension conditions.lower in Italy and Spain. Finally, contrary to public perception, job secu-
rity is not signiﬁcantly greater in the public sector once selection is
taken into account. The job loss rate is actually higher in thepublic sector
in Germany than it is in the private sector.
When aggregated into lifetime values (the construction of which we
describe below), the above components yield substantial positive premia
in the middle and lower parts of the distribution of lifetime values in
France and Spain. However, workers at the top of the distribution in
the Netherlands are worse off in the public sector in the long term. The
cross-sector difference in income inequality in Spain appears to be relat-
ed to the transitory component of earnings, whereas for Germany and
the Netherlands it is a more permanent feature of the distributions.
Putting these results in the context of local institutions offers plausi-
ble causal mechanisms behind the existence of a public sector lifetime
premium. In France and Spain, substantial barriers to access to public
sector jobs are in place in the form of demanding and lengthy entry
examinations. These are also the countries where we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
lifetime premia in the public sector. Whilst we do not claim to show
any causal effect between these two observations, we note that they
are consistentwith a partial structuralmodel of individual sector choice
based on lifetime values and cost of public sector entry.
The paper proceeds as follows: the related literature is reviewed in
the next section, followed by a description of the institutional context
of each country in Section 3 and a descriptive analysis of each country's
data in Section 4. The statistical model to be estimated is detailed in
Section 5, with the results analysed in Section 6. The lifetime values of
employment in each sector are computed in Section 7 allowing us to
contrast the public–private differences accounting for earnings and job
mobility with straightforward cross-sectional earnings differences.
How these ﬁndings relate to the labour market structures in each
country is considered in Section 8 before Section 9 concludes.
2. Related literature
This paper relates to two different literatures: the public–private pay
differences literature, and the literature on incomemobility and lifetime
inequality. Within the public–private literature, this paper contributes
by presenting an application of this dynamic modelling approach and
by deriving a set of estimates of public–private pay gaps across a num-
ber of major European countries, estimated with a common model on
data from a homogenized, multi-country longitudinal data set. Relating
countries' lifetime premia to their institutional and labour market
structures offers a plausible explanation for our ﬁndings, especially
since we can rule out dataset, time-period or modelling approach as
the source of any differences.
As noted in the introduction, the vast majority of the public-pay
gap literature concentrates on cross-sectional differences in wages
and on the extent to which these can be explained by non-random se-
lection into sector (see Disney and Gosling, 2003, for the UK,
Dustmann and van Soest, 1998; Melly, 2005, for Germany, Hartog
and Oosterbeek, 1993; Van Ophem, 1993, for the Netherlands,
Bargain and Melly, 2008, for France, and Lassibille, 1998, for Spain).
Explicit cross-country comparison of public–private wage differ-
entials is rare, however Lucifora and Meurs (2006) investigate
public-pay gaps in Britain, France and Italy. For France and Italy they
conclude that the private sector use of collective bargaining and
union power results in a pay setting system based heavily on reward-
ing observable characteristics (education, experience), which can ex-
plain the most part of the public sector wage gap. The quantile
regression analysis echoes Melly's ﬁndings for Germany, suggesting
that as one moves up the distribution, the proportion of the pay gap
explained by observable characteristics increases, whereas in the
lower quintiles differences in unobserved characteristics are more im-
portant in explaining pay differences. These results for France and
Italy are corroborated by Ghinetti and Lucifora (2007) using ECHP
data from the ﬁnal wave, 2001.
6 For Germany and the Netherlands the public wage bill was 8–9% of GDP, for France,
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cases deal with the endogeneity of sector choice through either
functional form assumptions (Van Ophem, 1993) or an instrumental
variables approach (Dustmann and Van Soest, 1998; Hartog and
Oosterbeek, 1993), they consider only cross-sectional differences in
instantaneous earnings between sectors.
Cappellari (2002) is the only other study (bar Postel-Vinay and Turon,
2007) to address differences in earnings dynamics between the public
and private sector. He uses a panel of Italian administrative data and im-
poses the assumption of exogenous selection of individuals into sectors.
As many studies attest to the critical importance of non-random sorting
of workers across sectors, we model the employment dynamics along-
side the earnings dynamics in order to form a more complete picture.
This paper also relates to the vast literature on empirical models of
income dynamics and their application to the study of lifetime income
inequality. Within this broad literature there are a number of ap-
proaches, though the majority of contributions (including ours) use
ﬂexible reduced-form models of either absolute or relative earnings
mobility to decompose the earnings process into a permanent and a
transitory component. Differences between individuals in the perma-
nent component are interpreted as a measure of lifetime inequality
(see inter alia Lillard and Willis, 1978; Gottschalk and Mofﬁt, 1993;
Gottschalk, 1997; Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999; Bonhomme and Robin,
2009). A second line of attack is to take amore structural approach de-
rived from job search theory and analyse inequality in lifetime values
and how this inequality has evolved over time (see Bowlus and Robin,
2004; Flinn, 2002). Whilst each of these papers contributes to the
body of evidence on lifetime inequality in earnings, none of them
consider lifetime differences between job sectors.
So whilst there is a large literature considering the public–private
pay gap in a cross-sectional context, controlling for the non-random
nature of sector choice, and a large literature considering lifetime
inequality in earnings using dynamic models, the marriage of the two
is very rare, a gap that this paper ﬁlls for Europe.4
3. Institutional context
Differences in wage setting practices, contract types, entry require-
ments, career pathways and pension provisions between the public
and private sectors impart different dynamics and affect the public–
private gap in both pay and lifetime values. Thus differences between
these factors across countries may relate to the differences in public
premia in earnings and lifetime values that we ﬁnd. Below we brieﬂy
describe the similarities and differences in these various dimensions
between the public and private sectors and across countries.5
3.1. Wage setting
It is generally the case that various political, institutional and eco-
nomic factors interact to explain the determination of public and private
sector wages. Whilst the private sector is subject to proﬁt constraints,
the public sector is governed by political considerations and budgetary
imperatives. The degree of unionisation, the extent of collective
bargaining and the ease of measuring productivity affect pay determi-
nation differentially across the sectors. Moreover, the government
may be politically motivated to pay higher wages to its lower skilled
employees than would be found in the private market and be reluctant
to pay the high wages found at the top end of the private sector wage
distribution. Working for the state has been associated with certain
privileges and a coveted status, especially for those public employees
who are civil servants – hence the remuneration, especially at the top,4 The ‘gap’ in the literature for theUK having been addressed by the earlier Postel-Vinay
and Turon (2007) paper.
5 For a more complete characterisation of each country along the various dimensions
see Dickson et al. (2014).is not all in terms of wages. This general characterisation broadly
captures the situation in each of the countries in our data.
In light of potential concerns about privatisations and changes over
time, it is worth noting that throughout the period of our data
(1994–2001) the size of the public sector wage bill – in terms of percent-
age ofGDPandpercentage of overall government spending– remains sta-
ble within each country.6 Though there were institutional changes
implemented in many European countries during the 1990s – aimed at
increasing competition and efﬁciency in the public sector – it remained
the case that the rules determining pay and conditions differed signiﬁ-
cantly between the sectors (see Giordano et al. (2011)).
Cluster analysis of wage setting institutions for both sectors,
performed by the European Central Bank, ﬁnds that France and the
Netherlands plus Germany and Italy all fall into the same group who
exhibit a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining (see Du Caju
et al., 2008). The system is characterised by a high level of collective
agreement coverage, the dominance of sector level wage bargaining
and the absence of coordination other than through minimum wages.
France and the Netherlands differ from Germany and Italy in that they
have national minimum wage policies. Spain also has a national
minimum wage, in addition to indexation, inter-sectoral agreements
and a more inﬂuential role of the government in wage setting.
Compared with the UK, the nations we consider all have strongly
regulated labour markets, impacting both the public and private sec-
tor wages. Civil servants' pay is set by law in each country, whilst col-
lective bargaining determines pay agreements at the national level in
other public sector jobs and in the private sector, with most em-
ployees in each country covered by a collective agreement. There is
no automatic indexation of public sector wages to prices in any of
the countries, rather public sector wage growth is determined by
bargaining with reference to productivity (at company level) and de-
velopments in the macro economy and budgets (at national negotia-
tion level). For all of the countries in our data public sector wages
are set at the national level.7 Germany, France, Italy and Spain have
very rigid and deterministic pay scales for civil servants according to
the hierarchical level, corps, grade and particular post. Whilst in the
French and Italian systems pay can reward effort via the bonus struc-
tures, the Spanish civil service pay system explicitly allows some
performance-related element. In the private sector, France differs
slightly in that the ﬁrm level is the most important for pay negotiation
rather than the industry/sectoral level which is used to set industry
minimum levels, with anything above this negotiated at the ﬁrm
level (see Broughton, 2009; European Commission, 2013).3.2. Contract types
There is a marked distinction between civil servants (the status of
Fonctionnaire in France, of Beamte in Germany or of Funcionarios in
Spain) and other public sector employees in the majority of the coun-
tries that we study. The difference relates to protection from termina-
tion, wage schemes and pension entitlements. The Netherlands is the
exception to this, where the civil service does not enjoy the same sort
of privilege as compared to the rest of the public sector (see United
Nations, 2006). Another notable outlier is Spain's use of ﬁxed-term
contracts, predominantly in the private sector. Throughout the period
of our data, the proportion of employees on ﬁxed-term contracts in
Spain was approximately 30%. This is much higher than Italy (10%),
Germany (12%) and both France and the Netherlands (14%) (see
European Commission, 2004).Italy and Spain itwas slightly higher at 10%. As a proportion of total government spending,
in France and Spain the public wage bill is almost 25%, whereas in Italy it is around 20%,
lower still in the Netherlands, 18%, and Germany, 15% (see Tepe, 2009).
7 This is no longer the case inGermanywhere public pay is now set at regional level, but
was the case during the period of our data.
8 There are slight systematic differences in part-time shares across sectors but the per-
centage of employeesworking part-time in each dataset is extremely small: for theprivate
sector (resp. public sector) the ﬁgures are Germany 0.5% (1.0%), Netherlands 2.8% (4.5%),
France 1.5% (3.7%), Italy 1.5% (3.2%), Spain 1.9% (1.6%). Including/excluding part-time
workers in the analysis has negligible impact on our results.
9 In addition to those reporting themselves to be unemployed, the unemployment cat-
egory includes: working unpaid in a family enterprise, in education or training (though
having been in the labour market at some point), doing housework, looking after children
or other persons, working less than full-time hours, and other economically inactive peo-
ple.We include these categories of inactivity in the unemployment deﬁnition in order not
to lose the information of individuals who temporarily transit out of the labour market,
however any individual who has more than three periods of inactivity or more than two
consecutive periods of inactivity is dropped. Any individual working less than full-time
hours has their earnings information censored and so does not contribute to themodelling
of wages.
10 We do not drop these observations only replace their earnings as missing. Therefore
the individuals concerned still convey information to the sample and contribute to the
modelling of the labour market dynamics.
11 Results using the UK sample in the ECHP, which is itself taken from the BHPS, concur
with those found by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) when using a larger sample available
in the British Household Panel Survey.
12 There is some sample attrition which we assume to be exogenous. Some of the attri-
tion is a consequence of our sample construction rules that treat individuals as censored
from the ﬁrst time they have a gap in their response history. See Appendix A for more
details.
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For the most part, recruitment to the non-civil service roles in the
public sector is similar to recruitment into the private sector. Entry into
the civil service is quite different however: in France, Italy and Spain,
entry to the civil service is on the basis of open, competitive examina-
tions held each year. Eligibility to sit the exam depends on educational
qualiﬁcations and in some cases (France) age. These countries recruit
individuals explicitly for a career in the civil service and their suitabil-
ity for such a career is assessed in the recruitment process. This is in
contrast to Germany and the Netherlands where the recruitment sys-
tem is appointment-based rather than career-based. Moreover, there
are no entry examinations for the civil service in Germany or the
Netherlands and there is no central recruitment administration.
For the most part, the countries in our data offer life-time tenure to
their civil servants. This is the case in Germany, France, Italy and Spain:
civil servants cannot be dismissed except for cases of misconduct. The
Netherlands differs in that civil servants have the same level of employ-
ment protection as other workers. Furthermore, in the Netherlands,
promotion is on the basis of merit, with no guaranteed wage increases
on the basis of seniority. Despite this lack of a guaranteed career, most
civil servants in the Netherlands do remain in the service for their
whole career (see United Nations (2006)).
Germany is an intermediate case in which despite not being recruit-
ed with the full career in mind, civil servants followwell-deﬁned career
paths, as do non-civil servant public sector workers. France, Italy and
Spain are very similar with respect to the pay and career structures in
the public sector. Jobs are classiﬁed into groups, with the education
level determining which group an individual will belong to and their
starting pay and pay scale. Progress up thepay scale is then automatical-
ly determined on the basis of years served, though in each country there
are mechanisms – bonus structures (France, Italy) and individual
allowances (Spain) – that allow some element of merit-based pay and
selection for promotion to higher levels.
Thus in all countries, bar the Netherlands, the evolution of pay
throughout a career in the public sector is very much determined by
seniority, though with some ﬂexibility around the basic systematic
pay progression.
3.4. Pensions and retirement
Inmany countries – includingGermany, France, Italy and Spain – the
pension schemes available in the public sector are seen as an important
component of the total remuneration, and in the civil service in particu-
lar, part of the incentive to attract high skilled workers into this career.
The exception again is the Netherlands, where there is no distinctive
scheme for the public sector.
Germany and France operate distinct pension schemes for civil ser-
vants, with (deﬁned) beneﬁts determined according to factors such as
years of service, ﬁnal pay, seniority and marital status (France). Other
employees in the public sector contribute to the statutory social security
pension schemes and are entitled to the earnings-related pension and
an occupational pension instead. This is similar for private sector
workers. In the German private sector coverage is much lower, making
public-sector pension provision generally much better (see Börsch-
Supan and Wilke, 2004).
Unlike Germany and France, the Spanish scheme for civil servants is
the same as for all public sector workers, is funded by social security
contributions and is not particularly more advantageous than the
main state scheme open to private sector workers.
Italy is slightly different: its standard state pensions are related to
earnings over the entire working life and to age at retirement. Individ-
uals can choose a retirement age between 57 and 65, with pensions
then related to the average life expectancy at the age of retirement.
Prior to 1992 the public sector pensions were much more favourable.
The public sector scheme does remain advantageous, allowing areplacement rate of up to 80% whereas the private scheme equivalent
maximum is closer to 70 (see Franco, 2002).
With respect to age at retirement, the normal retirement age in each
country does not differ between the sectors, with the exception of Spain
where public sector workers have a mandatory retirement age of 65
(which is the normal retirement age in the private sector) but it is
normal to retire at 60 (see Palacios and Whitehouse, 2006).4. Data
4.1. The European Community Household Panel
We use data from the European Community Household Panel
(henceforth ECHP) which is a longitudinal survey of households and
individuals carried out in 15 European Union countries annually be-
tween 1994 and 2001. Within each country, we restrict our sample
to males in order to avoid issues around female labour market partic-
ipation and we also drop from the sample anyone who is retired. We
exclude individual young men who are yet to leave full-time educa-
tion. Amongst those who are working we restrict the sample to full-
time8 workers (deﬁned as working 30+ hours per week) and only in-
clude the observations for individuals aged from 20 to 55 in their ﬁrst
observation. We deﬁne three ‘sectors’ of labour market activity: em-
ployment in the private sector, employment in the public sector, and
unemployment.9 We use current gross monthly earnings reported
once per year and deﬂated using each country's CPI and detrended
within each country. We trim the earnings data by treating earnings
observations below the 2nd and above the 98th percentile of earnings
within each ‘education’ × ‘job sector’ cell as missing data.10
The rules governing inclusion in the sample, added to the relatively
small population size of some of the countries involved in the ECHP,
results in sample sizes that are too small to implement our model in
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Austria, Finland,
Portugal and Sweden. However, we do retain a usable sample in ﬁve
countries: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain.114.2. Basic sample description
In each country, the constructed sample retains themenwho have a
minimum of 4 (maximum of 8) consecutive observations.12 Table 1
shows for each dataset the number of individuals in total, the average
number of consecutive observations per individual, broken down by
initial sector of employment.
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is around 6.5 and does not exhibit much variation across countries
or sectors of employment. Individuals initially observed unem-
ployed have a slightly smaller (6) average number of sample
observations.
For each country we look at (log) current gross monthly earnings.
Differences in the distribution of monthly work hours for full-time
workers could lead to differences between the picture we will de-
scribe and that obtained with hourly wages. As our focus is to con-
struct a measure of lifetime differences in the value of employment
in either sector, we have chosen to use monthly earnings. Table 2
shows the weekly hours distributions by sector for each country.
In France and Spain, median weekly hours are identical across the
two sectors. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, the public sector
median weekly hours are respectively 1, 2 and 4 hours less than pri-
vate sector hours. The standard deviation of hours tends to be smaller
in the public sector, the difference ranging from57minutes (Italy) to 1
hour and 40 minutes (Netherlands).
4.3. Differences in education
The ECHP includes a standardised education measure – the ISCED
classiﬁcation13 – coded into 3 categories: “high” is ISCED levels 5–7
and corresponds to all classes of tertiary level education, “medium” is
ISCED level 3, corresponding to upper-secondary (post-compulsory)
education, and “low” is ISCED levels 0–2, corresponding to levels of
education up to the end of secondary schooling.
Table 3 shows that Germany, the Netherlands and France have
similar proportions of highly educated workers (around 25% of the
workforce) whilst just under one third of the Spanish workforce falls
in the high education bracket and only 10.5% in Italy. Proportions of
low-educated workers vary considerably across countries, from a low
10.5% in Germany to 43.3% in Spain. In each country, the public sector
has a greater proportion of highly educatedworkers. This is particularly
pronounced in Spain where the public sector proportion of highly
educated is more than double the corresponding ﬁgure for the private
sector. Public sector employees are everywhere older and with greater
potential labour market experience14 than their private sector counter-
parts. This gap is most marked in the Netherlands and Italy (2.6 and
2.0 years of experience, respectively).
4.4. Raw differences
As Table 4 illustrates, the raw public pay gap in wage levels is
positive in all ﬁve countries, from a few log-points in Germany, the
Netherlands and Italy (4.9, 9.3 and 10.2 respectively) to 13.4 log-
points in France (14.3%) and 27.0 log points (31.0%) in Spain. With re-
spect to the dispersion of earnings the public and private sectors exhibit
notable differences. For Germany, the Netherlands, France and Spain,
the standard deviation of log earnings is lower in the public than the
private sector to around the same extent. In Italy the extent of pay
dispersion is similar in each sector.
Our point in this paper is that these differences only represent one
dimension of public–private differences as wewill show below that dy-
namic differences in earnings mobility and job mobility are substantial
too and must be taken into account if one tries to gauge long-term
differences between employment in either sector.
One-lag autocovariances of earnings show a greater persistence
amongst those individuals continuously employed in the public sector
than amongst those continuously employed in the private sector, across
all countries.13 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education. We discuss in Appendix B an alter-
native measure of education.
14 Labour market experience' or more accurately ‘potential labour market experience’ is
deﬁned as current age minus the age when the individual ﬁrst entered the labourmarket.As can be seen from the ‘Observed’ panels of Tables 8–12 direct
transitions from the private to the public sector are very uncommon:
only 1% to 2% of individuals initially employed in the private sector
move to the public sector the next year; however movements in the
opposite direction are more frequent, between 7.0% and 8.5% of
those employed in the public sector in year t-1 are employed in the
private sector in year t, with the exception of France where transition
probabilities relating to both directions of movement are very small.
Moreover, for each country bar the Netherlands, the annual transition
rate into unemployment from the private sector is much larger than
the corresponding ﬁgure for the public sector.
The descriptive statistics shown in this section make it clear that
in all countries, the public and private sectors differ in cross-
sectional earnings levels and both earnings and employment dy-
namics – all elements that will be important to forward-looking
agents.
5. A model of employment and wage dynamics, between and
within sectors
5.1. General structure
Our statistical model follows Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007),
adjusted to accommodate the format of ECHP data. In each country,
the constructed dataset is a set of N individuals, indexed i= 1,… N,
each of whom we follow for Ti consecutive years (where 4 ≤ Ti ≤ 8,
for all i). Each year we observe the individual's employment status
and sector, their monthly earnings if employed and a selection
of characteristics. A typical observation for an individual i can be
represented by the vector15 xi = (yi, Si, ziv, zif), where:
• yi ¼ yi1;…; yiTi
 
is the observed sequence of individual i's log
earnings ﬂows.
• Si ¼ Si1;…; SiTi
 
is the observed sequence of individual i's labour
market states at interview dates. We deﬁne the three distinct labour
market states: employed in the private sector, employed in the public
sector and unemployed. Sit indicates which of the three above states
individual i is in at date t.
• zvi ¼ zvi1;…; zviTi
 
is a sequence of time-varying individual characteris-
tics. In our application we only consider (polynomials in) potential
labour market experience, deﬁned as the current date less the date
at which individual i left full-time education.
• Finally, z if is a set of individual ﬁxed characteristics. It includes
education level (the 3 ISCED levels) and experience at the time
when the individual entered the panel. Hence ziv is deterministic
conditional on zif.
In addition to the individual observed heterogeneity as captured
by ziv and zif, we allow time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity to
inﬂuence individual's wages and selection into the various labour
market states. The speciﬁc form we allow this heterogeneity to take
is outlined in Section 5.2 below, for now we simply append the set ki
of time-invariant unobserved characteristics to the individual's data
vector xi.
We aim to estimate simultaneously transitions between unemploy-
ment and employment, transitions between the public and private sec-
tor, and earnings trajectories within and between employment sectors.
Omitting the parameters that condition the various parts of the model
for the sake of conciseness, we deﬁne the individual's contributions to
the complete likelihood as:
Li xi; kið Þ ¼ ‘i yijSi; zvi ; z fi ; ki
 
 ‘i Sijzvi ; zfi ; ki
 
 ‘i kijzfi
 
 ‘ z fi
 
: ð1Þ15 Throughout the paper vectors will be denoted by boldface characters.
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last term, ‘(zif), is the observed sample distribution of individual charac-
teristics zif. Since ziv is deterministic conditional on zif there is no need
for it to feature in this last term. This sample distribution is observed
and is independent of any parameter. The penultimate term, ‘(ki|zif),
is the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity ki
given observed characteristics zif. The second term is the likelihood of
an individual's labour market history given individual heterogeneity,
‘(Si|ziv, zif, ki). Finally the ﬁrst term in the individual likelihood contri-
bution is the likelihood of earnings history given their labour market
history and individual heterogeneity, ‘(yi|Si, ziv, zif, ki). The ﬁrst three
terms in the individual likelihood depend on various subsets of the
model's parameters.We obtain estimates of those parameters bymax-
imizing the sample log-likelihood, ∑Ni¼1log ∫Li xi; kið Þdki
h i
. We will
now outline the speciﬁcs of the modelling of each component of
Eq. (1), beginning with the treatment of unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
5.2. Unobserved heterogeneity
In addition to the observed heterogeneity, we consider two types
of unobserved heterogeneity: ki = (kim, kiy). The ﬁrst dimension of
this heterogeneity, kim, relates to the individual's propensity to be un-
employed or to work in the public sector (and will be referred to
henceforth as their ‘mobility class’). The second dimension, kiy, refers
to heterogeneity in terms of earnings (hereafter referred to as ‘wage
class’) through its impact on both earnings levels and earnings mobil-
ity. Both kim and kiy are time-invariant random effects which are
allowed to be correlated in an arbitrary manner. The mobility class,
ki
m, conditions all the parameters of themodel relating to employment
and sector history, whilst the wage class, kiy, conditions the parame-
ters relating to earnings history both in terms of levels and persis-
tence. The inclusion of earnings heterogeneity via a time-invariant
wage class term helps to capture the persistence in earnings rank,
which is not always possible to characterise with fairly low-order
Markov processes.
Our inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity classes also allows us to
address the selection problem outlined in Section 4. Indeed, whilst the
selection into sectors explained by observed variables accounts for the
differences between ‘raw’ gaps and the premia controlling for selection
on observables, selection into sectors arising from unobserved factors
causes an endogeneity bias if this selection is correlated with an unob-
served earning ability, since the public sector dummy is then correlated
with the error term. In our speciﬁcation, mobility classes capture an
unobserved propensity to belong to the public sector – which is not
perfectly correlated with the public sector dummy because of the
panel nature of our data and the mobility across sectors (observed to a
varying extent in all countries in our sample). The unobserved propen-
sity to earn higher income is captured by income classes. The above-
mentioned correlation at the root of the endogeneity issue is thus
allowed for, in our speciﬁcation, by the correlation between the propen-
sity to belong to the public sector mobility class and the propensity to
belong to the high-income class – which we do not constrain in any
way. Once income andmobility classes are included in the speciﬁcation,
the remaining error term in the income regression is uncorrelated with
the public sector dummy and the concern for an endogeneity bias is
addressed.
We refer to mobility and wage classes as we employ a ﬁnite mixture
approach to modelling the unobserved heterogeneity in which each in-
dividual can belong to one of Kmmobility classes and Kywage classes.1616 We implement this approach following Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), theﬁnitemix-
ture approach providing a tractable method to account for unobserved heterogeneity.In total there are K= Km × Ky classes. The probability of belonging to a
given class depends on the observed individual heterogeneity, zif:
Pr kmi ; k
y
i jz fi
n o
¼ Pr kyi jkmi ; zfi
n o
 Pr kmi jz fi
n o
: ð2Þ
To be more speciﬁc, we model each component of Eq. (2) as a mul-
tinomial logit with Ky and Km outcomes respectively. All of the details
of the model speciﬁcation are gathered in Appendix C. The observed
individual characteristics used in the estimation of the distribution of
latent classes are a subset of the variables used in the estimation of
the mobility and earnings processes. Of course identiﬁcation would be
stronger in the presence of an instrument, but failing to ﬁnd an obvious
candidate in our dataset we settled for identiﬁcation relying on func-
tional form assumptions regarding the speciﬁcation of probabilities to
belong to a given class and these processes. One way to look at our
methodology is to consider the likelihood component relating to the la-
tent class as similar to a randomeffect à la Chamberlain (1980)whereby
the correlation between the individual random effect and the observed
variables is captured (in a non-linear way) as a function of the individ-
ual ﬁxed characteristics.
5.3. Labour market mobility
The second component of Li xi; kið Þ in Eq. (1) relates to the
individual's labour market mobility. The transitions between the three
labour market states are speciﬁed as to depend only on the individual's
state in the previous observation and on observed andunobserved char-
acteristics, thus labour market states aremodelled as following a condi-
tional ﬁrst-order Markov chain. It is useful at this point to introduce the
indicators eit and pubit which respectively denote the individual's em-
ployment state and job sector at the date-t interview. Speciﬁcally,
eit= 1 if i is employed at the date-t interview, 0 if unemployed; pubit
is only deﬁned if eit = 1, with pubit = 1 if individual i is employed in
the public sector, and 0 if he is employed in the private sector. We
thus model the complete (within panel) labour market histories in
two stages: the probability of employment at the date-t interview
(eit = 1), given last period sector and individual heterogeneity, and
the probability of public sector employment at the date-t interview
(pubit = 1), given employment at date-t (eit = 1), previous sector and
individual heterogeneity. These probabilities are speciﬁed as:
Pr eit ;pubit jSi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Pr eit jSi;t−1; zvi;t−1; zfi ; kmi
n o
 Pr pubit jeit; Si;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n oh ieit
;
ð3Þ
where Si,t = (eit, pubit). Both elements of Eq. (3) are modelled as logits.
We address our initial conditionsproblemby specifying thedistribu-
tion of the initial labour market state, Si1, i.e. model the joint probability
of (ei1, pubi1) as a function of observed and unobserved heterogeneity
(zif, kim) in the form of a product of two conditional logits:
Pr ei1;pubi1jz fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Pr ei1jz fi ; kmi
n o
 Pr pubi1jz fi ; kmi
n oh ieit
: ð4Þ
Therefore, the contribution to the likelihood of an individual's job
mobility trajectory is:
‘i Sijzvi ; z fi ; kmi
 
¼ Pr Si1jz fi ; kmi
n o
 ∏
Ti
t¼2
Pr Sit jSi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n o
; ð5Þ
where the components of the latter product are given by Eq. (3).
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The ﬁrst term in Li xi; kið Þ (Eq. (1)) involves the modelling of
individual earnings trajectories. We assume log earnings trajectories
yi to be the realisation of a Markov process of continuous random
variables Yt. Given the limitation of the sample dimensions, both
in terms of N and T, a second-order Markov process combined
with our assumed unobserved heterogeneity speciﬁcation seems
the best option. This allows us to write the likelihood of a given
earnings trajectory over T periods as a product of bi- or tri-variate
densities:
‘ yð Þ ¼ ‘ y2; y1ð Þ  ∏
T
t¼3
‘ yt jyt−1; yt−2ð Þ ¼ ‘ y2; y1ð Þ  ∏
T
t¼3
‘ yt ; yt−1; yt−2ð Þ
‘ yt−1; yt−2ð Þ
: ð6Þ
Again, so as not to overload the equations, we temporarily omit the
conditioning variables and individual index.
We assume that marginal log-earnings distributions to be normal
conditional on observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Thus both the earnings mean and variance are allowed to depend on
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity as well as current sector
and previous labour market status:
yit jpubit ; ei;t−1; zvit; z fi ; kyi
with μ it ¼ μ pubit; ei;t−1; zvit ; z fi ; kyi
  ∼
and
N μ it;σ2it
 
σ it ¼ σ pubit ; ei;t−1; zvit ; z fi ; kyi
 
:
ð7Þ
Introducing normalised log-earnings as eyit ¼ yit−μ itσ it , we now have
the triple eyit ;eyi;t−1;eyi;t−2Þ and the pair eyit ;eyi;t−1Þ as Gaussian
vectors with covariance matrices τ 3ð Þit and τ
2ð Þ
it respectively, which we
expand as:
τ 3ð Þit ¼
1 τi;t;t−1 τi;t;t−2
τi;t;t−1 1 τi;t−1;t−2
τi;t;t−2 τi;t−1;t−2 1
0@ 1A and τ 2ð Þit ¼ 1 τi;t;t−1τi;t;t−1 1
 
:
ð8Þ
These τs are individual-speciﬁc and are allowed to vary with ob-
served and unobserved heterogeneity and with labour market sector
at t, t–1 and t–2:
τi;t;t−1 ¼ τ1 pubit;pubi;t−1; zvit ; z fi ; kyi
 
and τi;t;t−2 ¼ τ2 pubit ;pubi;t−1;pubi;t−2; zvit; zfi ; kyi
 
:
ð9Þ
μ(⋅), σ(⋅), τ1(⋅) and τ2(⋅) are functions speciﬁed in Appendix C.
For individuals with complete earnings information, the Eq. (6)
earnings trajectory simpliﬁes to17:
‘i yijei;pubi; zvi ; zfi ; kyi
 
¼ ∏
T
t¼1
1
σ it
 	

∏
T
t¼3
φ3 eyit;eyi;t−1;eyi;t−2; τ 3ð Þit 
∏
T−1
t¼3
φ2 eyit ;eyi;t−1; τ 2ð Þit 
26664
37775; ð10Þ17 For the derivation of this expression see Appendix C. For individuals with incomplete
earnings information, the above expression is amended to accommodate for missing
data – see Dickson et al. (2014) for details.where φn ; τ nð Þ
 
is the n-variate normal pdf with mean 0 and covari-
ance matrix τ nð Þ.
We are effectively assuming that normalised log earnings follow a
familiar AR(2) process, though we build in some ﬂexibility by
allowing the τs to depend on observed (and unobserved) individual
characteristics in Eq. (9). This has the dual appeal of (a) helping to
more accurately ﬁt the observed mobility of income ranks, and
(b) informing one of the key questions that we aim to address: name-
ly how income mobility varies across individuals and across sectors.
The τs offer an index of income mobility which we will use to shed
light on this key question. We acknowledge that an implicit assump-
tion of the model outlined above is that transitory shocks to the earn-
ings process are independent of the transitory shocks to the processes
determining mobility between the labour market sectors. To put this
another way, we assume that the individual earnings process only af-
fects individual mobility between states through either observed
characteristics (e.g. education and experience) or through the time-
invariant unobserved individual random effects kim and kiy, and not
through any transitory (unobserved) shocks. This assumption leads
to the separability of the likelihood function into a part relating to
labour market mobility and a separate part relating to the earnings
process.
Although this assumption may appear unrealistic with regard to
job mobility motivated by wage differences, our aim in this paper is
to present a picture of employment and earnings in the private and
public sectors in terms of relating average (over the wage distribu-
tion) mobility between sectors, and earnings levels and dynamics in
each sector. To the extent that our unobserved heterogeneity classes
capture the unobserved characteristics that motivate movements
into one sector or the other, we can interpret the estimated premia
as causal effects. That said, we do not present a behavioural model
explaining why individuals are in a particular mobility and earnings
class, the stylised facts presented here will need to be understood
within a structural model highlighting the mechanisms of individual
behaviour giving rise to these facts. This is whatwe aim to do in anoth-
er paper (see Bradley et al., 2013), where individuals earning relative-
ly little in either sector do have a relatively strong incentive to accept
outside offers from either the same or the other sector, so that worker
mobility is related to wage rank.
5.5. Likelihood maximisation
Having established the speciﬁcations for the individual con-
tributions to the complete likelihood, Li xi; kið Þ deﬁned above, the
parameter estimates are obtained by maximisation of the sample
log-likelihood:
XN
i¼1
log
XKm
kmi ¼1
XKy
kyi ¼1
Li xi; kmi ; kyi
 
 0@ 1A; ð11Þ
where as touched on above, the individual random effects ki = (kim,
ki
y) are integrated out of the complete likelihood (1). We proceed
by employing a sequential (two-step) version of the EM algorithm
described in Dickson et al. (2014), which takes advantage of the sep-
arability of Eq. (1) to estimate the parameters governing themobility
process between labour market states by running a ﬁrst EM proce-
dure, before estimating the parameters governing earnings process-
es in a second EM procedure, in which the job mobility parameters
are given their ﬁrst-step estimated values. The advantage of this pro-
cedure is that it is computationally more stable given arbitrary
starting values and is more tractable than a direct frontal
maximisation of the total sample likelihood (11). Furthermore, it
can be shown that under the assumptions of identiﬁcation of the
model parameters and numerical convergence of the algorithm,
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the parameters (see Bonhomme and Robin, 2009).186. Results
Wenow turn to the presentation of our results in the following three
steps. We ﬁrst examine the estimated distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity in each country, both in terms of mobility and income and
show that allowing for unobserved heterogeneity matters both for the
prediction of individual employment (and sectoral) trajectories and
for income levels and dynamics. We then examine the ﬁt of the model
for each country, in order to establish that the model does a good job
of replicating not only cross-sectional earnings statistics in each coun-
try, but also the dynamics of each labour market and earnings. In the
third and ﬁnal stage, we summarise our results for the ﬁve countries
in our sample (and the UK for comparison) along the ﬁve dimensions
of public–private differences highlighted above, namely: cross-
sectional incomes (mean and dispersion), income persistence, returns
to experience, and job loss rate. Our estimation allows us to predict
these differences for the whole sample (by estimating a counterfactual
for each individual in the sample) as well as differences across sectors
including the difference in the subsets of our sample that have selected
themselves in each sector of (un)employment.
Two striking features emerge from our results. First, public–private
differences observed and commented upon in the public debate are in
most cases largely the result of individual selection into sectors. Second,
we ﬁnd sizable differences between sectors in all ﬁve of the dimensions
that we examine, suggesting that the usual emphasis on cross-sectional
earnings and job security differences gives an incomplete picture of the
public premium by ignoring differences in income dynamics.6.1. Unobserved heterogeneity
The model is estimated under the assumption that, within
each country, individual unobserved heterogeneity can be modelled
with two or three mobility classes and two wage classes. We set the
number of mobility classes to three for all countries except the
Netherlands and France, where it is set to two. We were guided in
the choice of these numbers by pragmatism, trying to balance the var-
ious concerns of descriptive accuracy, computational tractability and
model ﬁt.19 Tables of coefﬁcient estimates and standard errors are re-
ported in the Appendix of Dickson et al. (2014), but are omitted here
for the sake of brevity.20 Rather than commenting on ﬁve countries
times up to 76 coefﬁcients directly, we choose to concentrate on
more easily interpreted statistics – such as the predicted differences
in the four dimensions of interest, with and without controlling for
selection. This subsection will however include some details of the
results with respect to the two types of unobserved heterogeneity –
mobility and earnings – embedded in our speciﬁcation.18 It does have the drawback in that it converges to an estimator which differs from the
maximum-likelihood estimator and is not efﬁcient, being a two-step, incomplete-
information procedure.
19 On one hand, reducing the number of income classes does not replicate the income
persistence observed in the data. An alternative way to increase model persistence would
be to increase the order of the Markov process but the limited length of our panel pre-
cludes this possibility. On the other hand, increasing the number of classes increases the
computational cost dramatically andmakes the expositionmore cumbersomewhen refer-
ring to different types. Usual information criteria would tend to suggest more classes but
Nylund et al. (2007) suggest that these can be sensitive to small sample sizes.
20 An additional caveat should be raised here. Standard errors are calculated using the
product of scores, which is consistent if the parameter values used are ML estimates. Be-
cause, as mentioned earlier, our EM-based procedure is sequential, it differs from the ML
estimator. Thus, to attain consistent estimates of the standard errors we bootstrapped
the entiremodel. Standard errors on public premia are reported in results tables, standard
errors for other estimated values and each of the model's coefﬁcients are available in
Dickson et al. (2014).Tables 5 and 6 describe the distribution of individual types amongst
the various unobserved heterogeneity classes as well as the composi-
tion of each class in terms of education and experience.21 The ﬁrst
thing to note in Table 5 is that there is a substantial proportion of indi-
viduals in each class within each country, which supports the need to
allow for this type of heterogeneity given the observable characteristics
available in our dataset. With regard to the joint distribution of unob-
served heterogeneity classes, all classes (bar one in Germany) are pop-
ulated by at least 5% of the sample in each country. In the model
speciﬁcation, no restriction is imposed on the correlation between the
two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity, and we do ﬁnd a varying
degree of association between the probabilities of an individual to be-
long to a given mobility class and a given wage class across countries.
The pattern of the distribution across classes is verymuch correlat-
ed with selection into labour market state. When three mobility clas-
ses are used we ﬁnd one type selecting overwhelmingly into the
private sector, one into the public sector, whilst the third class is a
mixture ofmainly private sector workers, thoughwith a higher unem-
ployment rate than the other two. Note however that there is enough
sectoral movement for each type of worker to allow for our model
coefﬁcients to be identiﬁed.22 In the remainder of the paper we will
designate the mobility class which selects itself predominantly in the
private sector (resp. public sector) the ‘private worker’ (resp. ‘public
worker’) class and the class with a higher tendency to be unemployed
the ‘high unemployment’ class.
The upper rows of each country's panel in Table 6 show the human
capital characteristics of each mobility type. Compared to the ‘private
worker’ type, the ‘public worker’ type have a higher proportion of
highly educated workers and slightly more experience. The ‘high un-
employment’ type have substantially lower education than the other
two types. With respect to the distribution across income types, each
of the 5 countries' sample is fairly evenly split between the two earn-
ings classes, with one class earning more on average than the other, in
both sectors and often (i.e. inmost countries) enjoying greater returns
to experience.23 Again, the ‘higher earner’ types tend to be more edu-
cated than the other type, as illustrated in the bottom rows of each
country's panel of Table 6.
6.2. Model ﬁt
In order to assess themodelﬁt, we simulate themodel in each country
and then compare themodel-generateddata outcomeswith the real data.
6.2.1. Worker allocation and mobility between states
Looking at the cross-sectional statistics for all countries, Table 7, it
seems that themodelﬁts well the observed pattern ofworker allocation
to states and cross-job-state transition matrices at intervals of 1 and
5 years.24 In addition to the maximum distance between the observed
and predicted ﬁgures in any of the nine entries in each 3 × 3 matrix,
we report the maximum absolute distance between the observed and
predicted ﬁgures relating to the 2 × 2 matrices formed by excluding
the unemployment column and row of each matrix. This shows how
well the model is ﬁtting persistence in sector for those employed, and
the movement between sectors. In each case, for the t − 1 to21 Note: the ﬁgures in Table 6 refer to the ﬁrst observation for each individual, in order
that they are not affected by attrition. As a result, mean experience is lower than reported
in Table 3which uses the full NxT datasets, and somemobility classes have zero represen-
tation in the public sector, however this is due to looking only at the initial observation, all
class types are represented ineach sector for at least someof the time in the full panel data.
22 See Dickson et al. (2014) for ﬁgures on transition matrices by class.
23 See Dickson et al. (2014) for ﬁgures illustrating the earnings mean and returns to ex-
perience by wage class.
24 With up to 8 observations for some individuals in each dataset, in theory we could
look at 7-year lags for each country, however as there are relatively small numbers of in-
dividuals who have 8 observations, the cell sizes in the predicted data preclude robust ob-
served matrices at longer than 5 lags.
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order of 1% to 1.5%-points. This shows that we are ﬁtting the employ-
ment sector persistence well in all countries. For the longer-lag transi-
tions, from t − 5 to t, the model under-predicts unemployment
persistence, however the 2 × 2 matrices distances continue to be
small, of the order of 5%-points.25
6.2.2. Earnings dispersion and earnings mobility
We now turn to the model ﬁt in terms of cross-sectional earnings
distribution and earnings persistence – across thewhole earnings distri-
bution. Concentrating initially on the former, Figs. 1 to 3 plot the ob-
served and predicted log earnings densities for the private and public
sectors separately. In each country the model ﬁts the observed wage
distributions well.
We simulate full individual labour market histories – i.e. featuring
both earnings and job state transitions – with earnings evolving ac-
cording to the process outlined in our speciﬁcation. We can therefore
compare the predicted earnings quintile transition matrices with
those obtained from the real data. Again we do this at lags of both 1
and 5 years, see Tables 13 to 17.
Concentrating ﬁrstly on the 1-period transition matrices, across all
countries and cells of thematrices, the discrepancy are small, withmax-
imum differences ranging from 5 to 10%-points and median differences
being between 0.5 and 2.5%-points.26 Given the relatively parsimonious
speciﬁcation of earnings means, variances and covariances, and that we
have only four to six unobserved heterogeneity classes in total, this is a
very good ﬁt. Moreover, aswemove to longer lags, the ﬁt remains good,
with maximum distances ranging from 7 to 14% points. Spain is an
exception to this with a less good, though still acceptable, ﬁt.
Taking into consideration the ﬁt of cross-sectional job sector, job
sector mobility, the cross-sectional earnings distribution and earnings
mobility for each country we have seen that our statistical model does
a good job of capturing the observed levels and dynamics of labour
market state and individual income in each country and supports the
speciﬁcation chosen. This choice of speciﬁcation involved balancing
competing criteria and was constrained by the wish to estimate a
common model for all countries.
6.2.3. Possible alternative speciﬁcations
It is clear from the observed data that earnings are highly persistent
in each country, and the assumptions of our model give two mecha-
nisms through which this persistence is captured: the 2nd-order
Markov process for the evolution of earnings, and the time-invariant
unobserved wage classes. The combination of these assumptions goes
a long way to capturing the observed persistence in each country.
However, if we look at the prediction errors for each country, in
Tables 13 to 17, we see that for both the one-period earnings transitions
and the ﬁve-period transitions, the model in general under-predicts the
persistence in earnings. For some countries, persistence in the lowest
quintile(s) of earnings is actually over-predicted, especially at the
longer time lag, however the majority of cells in the main diagonal
of each country's income quintile transition matrices are under-
predicted by the model – indicating that we over-predict earnings
mobility to some extent. This aspect of the model could potentially be
improved by altering the two assumptions relating to the earnings pro-
cess, either by increasing the order of theMarkov earnings process or by
increasing the number of latent earnings heterogeneity classes. Howev-
er, given the nature of our estimation procedure, the computational cost
of expanding the model in either of these directions is very high. There
is a trade-off between the amount of “built-in” persistence resulting25 For brevity we report the 5-lag transition matrix statistics only, for the full matrices
see Dickson et al. (2014).
26 As our interest is in simulating lifetime earnings, we report the full 5-year transition
matrices and just statistics from the 1-year matrices which are available in full in see
Dickson et al. (2014).from the order of the Markov process, and the additional earnings
auto-correlation introduced by the time-invariant unobserved earnings
classes. The choice we made of a 2nd-order Markov process with two
wage classes was guided, as ever, by a number of competing concerns
including computational tractability, parsimony, model ﬁt and the
aim to estimate the same model speciﬁcation for each country. Given
these concerns, the model speciﬁcation was guided by the N × T
dimensions of each of the datasets we have: in each country we have
a relatively small N dimension – between 2564 (Netherlands) and
4567(Italy) individuals – balanced by a longer T dimension – each
individual having at least 4 and up to 8 observations.
There are a number of possible alternative strategies that are
computationally tractable. For example, removing the unobserved earn-
ings classes altogether would provide a model that is computationally
quick and easy to estimate, however in testing various model formats
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) consistently found that such models
grossly over-predict both job and earnings mobility at lags beyond 1
or 2 years. Similarly, restoring the assumption of unobserved earnings
classes but reducing the order of the Markov process for earnings to
just 1st-order is simpler and quicker to estimate, but again results in sub-
stantially larger prediction errors – as compared with the 2nd-order
process – at the longer lags. Given that the purpose of our paper is to
use themodel to construct the lifetime values of individual labour mar-
ket trajectories, having as good a ﬁt as possible of the earnings mobility
is extremely important. Thus the speciﬁcation using a 2nd-order
Markov process, two time-invariant unobserved wage classes and two
or three time-invariant unobserved mobility classes, appears to be the
right compromise for our purposes.6.3. Results — cross-sectional and dynamic differences
In order to distinguish selection effects from “true” potential differ-
ences in all outcomes of interest, we proceed in two stages. In the ﬁrst
one, we simulate potential outcomes in both sectors for all individuals
in the sample. The “whole sample” ﬁgures in our results tables de-
scribe these counterfactual outcomes. In a second stage, we simulate
outcomes in each sector only for individuals who have selected them-
selves in that sector in their ﬁrst period in the sample. The differences
obtained, denominated “whole sample, with selection”, illustrate dif-
ferences between sectors for these selected groups of individuals.
Table 18 summarises differences in the ﬁve dimensions of employ-
ment in either sector that we identiﬁed above as relevant for the cal-
culation of lifetime values of employment in the public or private
sector. These ﬁve dimensions are cross-sectional income mean and
standard deviation, ﬁrst auto-covariance of earnings, returns to expe-
rience and job loss rate. Results are reported for both sectors in the 5
countries in our sample, as well as for the UK for comparison with
our previous results.27
The right-hand side panel of Table 18 reports our ﬁndings relating to
the whole sample with selection. Unsurprisingly, these ﬁgures mirror
what we observe in the in raw data: the public sector apparently offers
a signiﬁcant positive income premium which is large in Spain (26 log
points) and sizable in Italy and France (12 and 13 log points respective-
ly). Public sector earnings exhibit greater persistence, particularly in Italy
and Spain. Returns to experience are signiﬁcantly higher in Germany for
employees in the public sector (by 4.7 log points per year), but lower in
Italy (by 6.3 log points per year). In the other countries, returns to expe-
rience are similar in the selected samples. In accordance with common
perception on public sector job security, the job loss risk is signiﬁcantly
lower in the public sector, particularly in Spain. Let us stress once more
however that this relates to the selected samples in both sectors. As we
will see below, this ﬁnding does not always reﬂect a “true” difference
in job loss risk once selection is taken into account.27 See Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007).
28 Whilst these valueswill be amore accurate reﬂection of reality in some countries than
others, again in the interest of having a common framework for all countries, we impose
these common parameters. As a robustness test we re-estimate with different values of
the replacement rate for each country*sector, with values guided by the best estimates
in the literature. The impact on lifetime values premia is negligible in almost all cases, since
the pension income is heavily discounted for the majority of individuals in each dataset.
For details, see Dickson et al. (2014).
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Table allows us to assess the extent of the selection occurring be-
tween the two sectors of employment. The most striking difference
lies in the income means ﬁgures where we observe a substantial pos-
itive selection into the public sector, particularly in the Netherlands
and Spain. The raw difference in incomemeans between Dutch public
and private sector employees is signiﬁcant and positive at 9 log
points, whereas we estimate the counterfactual “true” difference to
average over the whole sample as a signiﬁcant negative 4 log points.
In Spain, the raw difference is the largest in the countries in our sam-
ple, at 26 log points, whereas the counterfactual difference is at a less
surprising 11 log points, both signiﬁcant. So, even when controlling
for selection, the Spanish public sector offers an income premium
over private sector employment of over 10%, the largest true income
premium in our sample. Now turning to the other dimensions of dif-
ferences, we estimate little selection effect in terms of income persis-
tence or returns to experience. Looking at differences in job security,
we see that more stable employees select in the public sector in
Germany as controlling for selection in our counterfactual estimation
suggests a higher job loss rate in the public sector by 2.6% (annually),
whereas the public sector appears to offer more job security in the se-
lected sample, with a lower apparent job loss rate by 2.6%, both statis-
tically signiﬁcant. In Spain, differences in job loss risk between the
“whole sample” and the “whole sample with selection” panels sug-
gest that ‘high unemployment’ types select themselves predominant-
ly in the private sector: the signiﬁcant job loss rate advantage of the
public sector becomes smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant once se-
lection is controlled for. These results are consistent with the fact
that the public sector tends to attract more educated and experienced
individuals.
This non-random sorting into employment sectors, whereby a posi-
tive selection into the public sector seems to occur, echoes both Hartog
and Oosterbeek (1993) and Van Ophem (1993)'s ﬁndings for the
Netherlands. In our French sample, we ﬁnd that this positive selection
into the public sector explains around three-quarters of the raw public
premium.
Now examining the left-hand side panel of the Table, we are able to
evaluate the potential differences that individuals in our sample would
experience (on average) between the two sectors, were they continu-
ously employed in either the private or the public sector. As detailed
above, the “true” public premium in mean income, abstracting from se-
lection effects, is still large, signiﬁcant and positive in Spain at 11 log
points. Returns to experience are found to be higher in the public sector
in Germany by 5.4 log points per year and lower in the public sector in
Italy by 6.3 log points per year. Returns to experience are similarly lower
in the public sector in Spain though the difference is not quite statistical-
ly signiﬁcant. Finally, once selection effects are taken into account, the
common perception that public sector employment is more secure all
other things equal is not conﬁrmed by our analysis in most cases: in
Germany, we ﬁnd a negative public premium in terms of job security
as the annual job loss rate in the public sector is 10.2% vs 7.6% in the pri-
vate sector. In each of the other four countries however, differences in
job loss rates are minimal and non-signiﬁcant once the impact of selec-
tion has been removed.
Our results for Germany are in line with the ﬁndings of Dustmann
and van Soest (1998) who consistently found a signiﬁcant negative
public premium, reducing in age (experience). In France, the true public
premium is largest at the bottom of the income distribution (see
Table 19, more on which below), which supports Bargain and Melly's
(2008) ﬁnding that blue collar workers gain themost from public sector
employment in France.
7. The public pay gap: earnings and lifetime values
In this sectionwe develop amore systematic analysis of the differ-
ences between the sectors in terms of lifetime values. We will ﬁrstdeﬁne and construct these lifetime values, then carry out counterfac-
tual simulations in which individuals are simulated for a ‘lifetime’ in
each sector. Of course, spending a whole career in one sector or the
other may not be the optimal choice for an individual worker. We
however ﬁnd it informative from the point of view of the policy de-
bate to compare the lifetime values of the two “extreme” trajectories
of a whole career in a public sector versus a whole career in the pri-
vate sector. This allows us to contrast our results regarding the public
premium with what is usually referred to in the public debate as a
measure the relative (dis)advantage of public sector employment,
namely the difference in instantaneous earnings between the two
sectors. We thereafter comment on the differences in lifetime values
obtained under these assumptions with regard to how they relate to
the differing institutional and labour market structures within each
country.
7.1. Construction of lifetime values
The notion of lifetime value that we shall use is the present
discounted sum of future income ﬂows, which is the relevant mea-
sure when individuals are either risk-neutral or can insure perfectly.
Using our estimated coefﬁcients for earnings distributions, and earn-
ings and job mobility, we can carry out simulations of employment
and earnings trajectories for the individuals in our sample until
retirement age which we assume to happen at a level of experience
denoted TR. In retirement a given individual enjoys a present
discounted sum of future earnings stream of VR (deﬁned below).
Given these assumptions, the lifetime value at experience level t of
an individual's simulated future earnings trajectory ys ≥ t is written
as:
Vt ys≥ tð Þ ¼
XTR
s¼t
βs−t  exp ysð Þ
" #
þ βTR−t  VR; ð12Þ
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and exp (yt) is the earnings ﬂow
that the individual receives at experience level t (yt designates log
earnings). At each level of experience t, current log earnings yt are
conditional on the individual's characteristics and labour market
state, as set out in the statistical model of Section 5 and more specif-
ically spelled out in Appendix C.
For all countries we set the discount factor to β=0.95 per annum.
The value of retirement, VR, is deﬁned as VR ¼ 1−β201−β  RR exp yTR−1
 
,
where RR designates the replacement ratio. Thus we assume that
after retirement, individuals receive a constant ﬂow of income
equal to RR times their last earnings in employment and discount
this ﬂow over a residual life expectancy of 20 years. We calibrate
the value of RR to 0.40 and the experience level at retirement to
45 years.28
One caveat that must be ﬂagged at this point, is that in conducting
this lifetime simulation exercise, we have to assume that, in each coun-
try, the economic environment is stationary. As is demonstrated in
Dickson et al. (2014), it is a reasonable assumption in each country.
Whilst it is unlikely that the economic environment does remain stable
throughout their working life, the assumption of stability is the best
guess individuals may make when forming expectations of their
lifetime earnings stream.
We run a series of counterfactual simulations in which we constrain
the probability of moving between sectors or into unemployment to be
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simulate their earnings trajectories. This yields the potential public
premium in lifetime values that we denominate (“whole sample”)
differences. As for cross-sectional earnings, our second comparison of
lifetime values forces individuals to remain in the sector of employment
in which they are ﬁrst observed in our sample over their whole lifetime.
This comparison is referred to as “whole sample, with selection”.
7.2. Lifetime values results
We look at the public premium both in log-earnings and in log-
lifetime values at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of their distribu-
tions. The public premium is deﬁned as the difference between the log
earnings (resp. log lifetime value) in the public sector and the private
sector. Our results are displayed in Tables 19 and 20.30
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the public premium in terms of cross-
sectional earnings does not necessarily reﬂect the public premium in
terms of lifetime values because of the differences in the dynamic char-
acteristics of employment in either sector. Presumably, forward-looking
individuals care about lifetime values more than about spot income
only, hence our argument that more emphasis should be put on a fuller
picture of public–private differences.
Looking at the “whole sample” panel, i.e. controlling for selection ef-
fects, the public premium at the 10th percentile in Italy is an insigniﬁ-
cant negative 2 log points, whereas the difference in log-earnings on
the same percentile is a positive and signiﬁcant at 8 log points. For
Spain the pattern is similar: the premium in lifetime values at the 10th
percentile is 8 log points, the corresponding ﬁgure for log-earnings is
18 log points. These patterns are explained by the fact that public sector
earnings are more persistent, which adversely affects lifetime values at
the bottom of the distribution, and that returns to experience are
found to be lower in the public sector in Italy and Spain. In both these
countries, these two effects counteract each other at the top of thedistri-
bution so that public premia are very similar at the 90th percentile in
terms of income or lifetime values. On the other hand, the public premi-
um in terms of income understates the public premium in lifetime values
by 3 to 5 log points in the middle of lower part of the distribution in
France and in the middle and upper parts of the distribution in
Germany. Here returns to experience are larger in the public sector
and income persistence is not signiﬁcantly different across sectors,
resulting in this greater lifetime values premium vis-a-vis log-earnings.
Unlike in our previous results obtained for the UK (included in the bot-
tom section of the Table for comparison), we observe some sizable life-
time values public premia in some countries/distribution percentiles:
workers enjoy a substantial positive public premium in lifetime values
in France and Spain across the distribution, particularly the middle and
lower parts, ranging from +6 (respectively +7) log points at the 50th
percentile up to +9 (resp. +8) log points at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. By contrast, a substantial negative lifetime public premium is found
at the top of the distribution in the Netherlands (−5 log points).
Turning now to the right-hand panel of Table 19, i.e. the premia
relating to the “whole sample, with selection”, and comparing it29 This exercise seems a useful way to simulate careers in a single sector. Indeed, an in-
dividual with a strong tendency to work in the private sector, if initially placed in the pub-
lic sector and allowed to lose his/her job will ﬁnd subsequent employment in the private
sector with a very high probability and pursue his/her subsequent career within that sec-
tor. As a consequence, any observed public premiumwill only be derived from years spent
in that sector prior to a ﬁrst unemployment episode, see Dickson et al. (2014). Of course,
this counterfactual exercise is a possible alternative to the one we chose to carry out. Our
choice is guided by a desire to measure the maximum extent that this premium could
reach, were individuals forced to stay for a whole working life in one sector as opposed
to the other.
30 Note: Tables 19 and 20 include premia in initial period wages to provide a comparison
with lifetime values; Table 18 simulates cross sectional wages in three successive periods in
order to utilise the second-orderMarkovmodel ofwage evolution, hence aswages increase
with experience the mean ﬁgures are slightly higher in Table 18 but premia remain the
same.with “whole sample” results, we ﬁnd that positive selection prevails
in all countries in our sample, across the distribution of lifetime values.
The positive selection is most pronounced at the 90th percentile in
France and Italy, slightly less so in Germany and the Netherlands,
and across the distribution in Spain. Thus both in terms of earnings
and lifetime values, selection effects are important: the public sector
has a much greater proportion of highly educated workers (for exam-
ple, 51.0% in the public sector versus 28.7% in the private sector in
Spain), and has more experienced workers. This echoes Lassibille's
(1998) ﬁndings for Spain.
With regards to the dispersion of lifetime values, as has been men-
tioned above, the dispersion of cross-sectional incomes is not very in-
formative of long-run inequality in the presence of income mobility.
This is particularly relevant when comparing dispersion between
two sectors where the volatility of income is different. Looking at the
dispersion of lifetime values gives a more accurate picture of long-
term inequality within each sector. Comparing dispersion in cross-
sectional income with the dispersion in lifetime values is informative
on the relative share of the variance in the permanent income compo-
nent within the variance of earnings. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007)
found that the greater dispersion of private sector income relative to
public sector incomes in the UKwaswholly due to a greater dispersion
of the transitory component of income.
In the ﬁve countries we are looking at in this paper, we only ﬁnd a
similar result for Spain (see Table 20). In Spain, the standard deviation
of incomes is 0.35 in the private sector versus 0.30 in the public sector,
whereas the standard deviation of lifetime values is the same for both
sectors. The results for France and Italy do not exhibit the same feature
hinting at no such dissimilarity between the relative shares of vari-
ances in the transitory and permanent income components in these
countries. For Germany and the Netherlands, both log earnings and
lifetime values have signiﬁcantly less dispersion in the public than
the private sector, to approximately the same extent. This suggests
that both the permanent and transitory components of income are
less dispersed in the public sector for these countries and both con-
tribute to the greater equality of pay in that sector.
8. Institutional differences and public premia
Whilst our model does not seek to explain the differences in public
pay and lifetime values that we ﬁnd across countries, it is instructive
to consider how the differences that we do ﬁnd relate to the institution-
al context within each country. As noted in Section 3, for the most part
the institutions and structures that determine public and private sector
pay are very similar across the group of countries in our study. Themost
notable exception to this is the Netherlands. It may be for reasons relat-
ed to this that we ﬁnd – after controlling for selection – a signiﬁcant
negative public premium in wages at the mean and at the top of the
wage distribution, and at the top of the distribution of lifetime values.
The Netherlands is the only country that does not have a clearly deﬁned
career path and largely deterministic pay scale for their civil service,
moreover the ofﬁce of civil servant is not invested with the same level
of privilege and security as is the case in the other countries.
Similarly, in Germany where there are no entry exams to access the
civil service the premium at the top is negative, though not statistically
signiﬁcant. Seniority plays a large part in remuneration in Germany and
we see this reﬂected in the signiﬁcantly higher returns to experience in
the public sector. This may be capturing the additional pay related to
marital and family status for civil servants in Germany which is more
likely to impact the upper half of the age distribution.
France, Spain and Italy are the countries that aremost similar to each
other in terms of their labour market institutions and structures. This
may explain why they are the only countries which, after controlling
for selection, retain a positive public premium at the mean in wages
and, for the former two at least, in lifetime values too. These countries
are similarwith respect to the recruitment and pay of their civil servants
Table 1
Sample statistics.
N % T
Germany Total 3402 100.0% 6.9
First observation Private 2422 71.2% 6.9
Public 614 18.0% 7.1
Unemployed 366 10.8% 6.4
Netherlands Total 2564 100.0% 6.7
First observation Private 1858 72.5% 6.7
Public 566 22.0% 6.8
Unemployed 140 5.5% 6.1
France Total 2619 100.0% 6.2
First observation Private 1634 62.4% 6.3
Public 660 25.2% 6.4
Unemployed 325 12.4% 5.8
Italy Total 4567 100.0% 6.6
First observation Private 2664 58.3% 6.7
Public 882 19.3% 6.7
Unemployed 1021 22.4% 6.2
Spain Total 3689 100.0% 6.6
First observation Private 2311 62.6% 6.7
Public 527 14.3% 6.7
Unemployed 851 23.1% 6.2
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reﬂected in a lifetime values premium in themiddle and top in the pub-
lic sector in these countries, capturing something of a compensating dif-
ferential. These countries are also the most similar in terms of their
collective bargaining arrangements and union power in general in the
public sector. This leads to a more egalitarian pay structure – to the
beneﬁt of the lower to medium skilled workers who gain a greater
relative premium. Spain is notably the country with the greatest differ-
ence between the premia at the top and the bottom of the distribution
both in earnings and lifetime values. This may be partly explained by
the high proportion of ﬁxed-term contracts in Spain, particularly in
the private sector. These contracts are associated with lower pay than
permanent employment contracts and this is likely to add to the premi-
um in earnings in particular in the lower part of the distribution in Spain
(see Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2005).
However, compared with the private sector, the rigid pay structures
in the Spanish and Italian public sectors leads to them having lower
returns to experience, signiﬁcantly so in Italy. This reduces the lifetime
value premium relative to the wage premium at the bottom of the
distribution in Italy and Spain.
The remaining signiﬁcant ﬁnding that may be related to differences
in institutional structures concerns the higher job loss rate in the public
sector for Germany. The fact that almost half of the German public sec-
tor workers (45%) are on private law labour contracts (the so called
“Angestellte”) that do not offer the employment protection of the civil
service may explain why we do not ﬁnd the same beneﬁt in terms of
lower job loss rate in Germany thatwe do inmost of the other countries.
9. Conclusions
Regardless of the country, the literature on public–private pay dif-
ferences tends to focus on cross-sectional differences in earnings, and
the extent towhich they can be ‘explained away’ by selection. However,
as the sectors also differ in terms of earnings mobility and job mobility,
these factors need to be taken into account in any assessment of the
long-term public-pay gap. In a dynamic environment forward-looking
agents care about their job security and earnings dynamics and antici-
pate that these differ between the sectors and this will affect their as-
sessment of the lifetime value of potential employment in either
sector. To derive a more informative comparison of pay in the public
and private sectors, we apply a ﬂexible model of earnings and employ-
ment dynamics, where the individual earnings and employment trajec-
tories are conditioned by unobserved as well as observed individual
heterogeneity.
We estimate the model on ECHP data for Germany, the
Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain (plus the UK to provide a compar-
ison). This is the ﬁrst time that a dynamic approach to public–private
pay differentials has been applied to these European countries, using
the same model and dataset. In each of the countries we are able to
ﬁt well the observed cross-sectional distribution of workers into sec-
tors and the cross-sectional earnings distributions. Importantly for
our purposes, we also ﬁt the patterns of labour market mobility and
earnings mobility very well. A recurring result is that selection is an
important contributor to all differences observed in the raw data.
After controlling for selection, we ﬁnd substantial differences in poten-
tial outcomes in all ﬁve dimensions of employment we are interested
in: spot incomes are larger in the public sector in France, Italy, Spain
and the UK, but lower in the Netherlands. There is a positive public
premium in terms of returns to experience in Germany, but this pre-
mium in negative in Italy. Public sector earnings exhibit greater persis-
tence in all countries, particularly so in Italy. As in the raw data, we
estimate greater income compression in the public sector in all coun-
tries in our sample. Finally, and contrary to perceptions in the public
debate, there are no large discrepancies between job loss risks in
both sectors. In fact, in Germany, the job loss risk in the public sector
is higher than in the private sector.When we aggregate these differences into our measure of lifetime
value of employment in either sector, we ﬁnd sizable potential premia
for some workers: individuals across the income distribution in France
and Spain face a positive lifetime premium, particularly in the middle
to lower ranges: decreasing from 8–9 log-points for individuals at the
bottom of the distribution to 6–7 log-points in themiddle before reduc-
ing to 3–5 log points (and not statistically signiﬁcant) at the top. A
negative public premium in lifetime values is found at the top of the
distribution in the Netherlands: 5 log-points in favour of the private
sector. Whilst income inequality in Spain results from the transitory
component of earnings contributing a higher share of the total variance,
in Germany and the Netherlands the level of inequality in the distribu-
tion is a result of both the permanent and transitory components.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that any assessment of the “public premium”
needs to take account not only of non-random selection of workers
into sector but also of the dynamic differences between the sectors.
These dimensions of difference compound over a lifetime and result in
a lifetime values public premium that can be very different to the
picture implied by looking simply at spot income differences.
We compare ourﬁndingswith public sector and labourmarket insti-
tutions in the countries in our dataset to highlight possible links be-
tween institutions and lifetime public premium. Our common dataset,
time-period and modelling approach allows us to rule out the differ-
ences in lifetime premia resulting from differences in the source of
data or empirical model. Whilst the majority of countries in our
data are similar in respect of the institutions and structures that deter-
mine recruitment and pay in the public and private sectors, the one
outlier – the Netherlands – is the only country to have a signiﬁcant
negative public premia in lifetime values at the top of the distribution.
The countries that are most similar and in particular the ones that
have the most stringent barriers to overcome in order to enter the
civil service – France, Italy and Spain – have signiﬁcant premia at the
mean, median and across the distribution of earnings, and for France
and Spain in lifetime values also. Examining a potential causality mech-
anism between institutions and public sector lifetime premium with a
theoretical model thus seems an interesting avenue for future research
and policy choices.10. Description tables
Table 4
Raw earnings and job loss differences by sector.
Germany Netherlands France
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Wage… …Mean 8.44 8.48 8.69 8.78 9.38 9.51
…Std. dev. 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.43 0.39
…1-Period
auto-covariance
0.80 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.91
1-Period job
loss rate
5.6 3.2 1.9 1.5 4.0 2.1
Italy Spain UK
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Wage… …Mean 7.91 8.01 12.22 12.49 7.43 7.53
…Std. dev. 0.30 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.38
…1-Period
auto-covariance
0.71 0.89 0.74 0.88 0.81 0.87
1-Period job
loss rate
3.5 1.6 6.4 3.5 3.5 2.2
Table 3
Human Capital.
Education
High Medium Low Age
(years)
Experience⁎
(years)
Germany Overall 29.3 60.2 10.5 39.1 20.0
Private 28.8 60.2 11.1 38.7 19.8
Public 37.9 58.8 0.3 40.7 20.8
Unemp 19.3 68.2 18.0 38.5 20.1
Netherlands Overall 25.2 56.3 18.4 40.4 21.2
Private 20.5 59.9 19.6 39.8 20.6
Public 44.0 45.7 10.3 43.1 23.2
Unemp 16.9 47.9 35.1 39.3 20.4
France Overall 27.1 44.8 28.1 39.2 20.3
Private 23.9 47.2 28.9 39.0 20.3
Public 35.8 41.7 22.5 40.9 21.7
Unemp 24.3 37.0 38.7 35.6 16.7
Italy Overall 10.5 49.5 40.0 37.9 19.9
Private 7.6 47.4 45.0 38.7 21.0
Public 19.6 54.8 25.6 42.2 23.0
Unemp 10.5 50.9 38.6 29.9 11.7
Spain Overall 33.0 23.7 43.3 38.1 20.8
Private 27.8 24.1 48.1 38.7 21.7
Public 58.9 21.4 19.7 40.5 21.8
Unemp 31.6 24.0 44.4 33.7 16.3
⁎ Experience is potential labour market experience i.e. current age minus the age when
the individual ﬁrst entered the labour market.
Table 2
Weekly hours distribution by sector.
Germany Netherlands France Italy Spain
Private sector Median 41 40 39 40 40
St. dev. 7.41 6.94 7.10 5.22 7.73
Public sector Median 40 38 39 36 40
St. dev. 6.22 5.28 5.66 4.27 6.39
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11.1. Unobserved heterogeneityTable 5
Distribution of individuals across mobility and wage classes.
Unobserved
heterogeneity
class
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
km = 1 km = 2 km = 3 km = 1 km = 2 km = 3
ky = 1 ky = 1 ky = 1 ky = 2 ky = 2 ky = 2
Germany 0.83 31.38 12.97 17.47 29.48 7.87 100.00
Netherlands 13.18 30.34 16.16 40.32 100.00
France 21.43 17.87 50.85 9.85 100.00
Italy 7.14 24.23 15.72 3.48 36.45 12.98 100.00
Spain 10.23 25.65 17.43 5.51 34.58 6.60 100.00
Table 6
Composition of unobserved heterogeneity classes.
Education
% high % med % low Mean…
exp.
…(log)
Wage
…Public …Unemp.
Germany
Mobility classes
km = 1 18 65 17 16.1 8.25 0.09 0.36
km = 2 29 59 12 16.8 8.43 0.00 0.06
km = 3 37 60 3 16.1 8.47 0.79 0.04
Wage classes
ky = 1 27 67 6 16.1 8.49 0.23 0.05
ky = 2 30 55 15 17.0 8.35 0.14 0.16
Total 29 60 11 16.6 8.42 0.18 0.11
Netherlands
Mobility classes
km = 1 41 45 14 18.5 8.76 0.75 0.13
km = 2 19 58 23 17.5 8.65 0.00 0.03
Wage classes
ky = 1 34 37 29 17.5 8.69 0.23 0.06
ky = 2 18 67 14 18.0 8.67 0.21 0.05
Total 25 54 21 17.8 8.68 0.22 0.06
France
Mobility classes
km = 1 26 47 27 20.1 9.41 0.31 0.01
km = 2 29 37 34 9.5 9.21 0.10 0.42
Wage classes
ky = 1 38 38 24 16.3 9.49 0.24 0.20
ky = 2 20 49 31 17.7 9.31 0.26 0.07
Total 27 44 29 17.2 9.37 0.25 0.12
Italy
Mobility classes
km = 1 9 49 42 14.78 7.86 0.08 0.71
km = 2 13 49 38 17.4 7.92 0.27 0.08
km = 3 6 52 42 15.4 7.89 0.07 0.34
Wage classes
ky = 1 15 49 36 19.3 7.98 0.21 0.22
ky = 2 7 50 43 14.1 7.86 0.18 0.22
Total 10 50 40 16.6 7.91 0.19 0.22
Spain
Mobility classes
km = 1 60 23 17 17.1 12.47 0.88 0.07
km = 2 28 25 47 17.2 12.16 0.00 0.12
km = 3 29 23 48 16.9 12.13 0.02 0.62
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Table 9
Netherlands: ﬁt to job mobility data.
Observed Predicted
State
at t–1
State at t State at t
↓ Private Public Unemp. Private Public Unemp.
Private 95.9 2.0 1.9 96.3 2.1 1.4 Max distance: 5.5
Public 8.5 89.8 1.5 7.7 91.4 0.8 Max distance,
2 × 2: 1.6
Unemp. 28.2 4.5 67.2 32.1 6.1 61.7
Five-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 25.2; Median distance: 3.0
Max distance, 2 × 2: 3.3; Median distance,
2 × 2: 1.9
Table 6 (continued)
Education
% high % med % low Mean…
exp.
…(log)
Wage
…Public …Unemp.
Spain
Wage classes
ky = 1 55 23 22 15.7 12.35 0.17 0.28
ky = 2 8 25 67 18.7 12.11 0.11 0.17
Total 33 24 43 17.1 12.23 0.14 0.23
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Germany: Fit to Job Mobility Data.
Observed Predicted
State
at t–1
State at t State at t
↓ Private Public Unemp. Private Public Unemp.
Private 93.1 1.2 5.6 94.4 1.2 4.3 Max distance: 7.6
Public 7.0 89.6 3.2 7.4 89.8 2.6 Max distance,
2 × 2: 1.3
Unemp. 32.7 5.1 62.1 38.7 6.6 54.5
Five-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 12.6; Median distance: 2.3
Max distance, 2 × 2: 2.5; Median distance,
2 × 2: 1.5
Table 10
France: ﬁt to job mobility data.
Observed Predicted
State
at t–1
State at t State at t
↓ Private Public Unemp. Private Public Unemp.
Private 95.5 0.4 4.0 96.7 0.3 2.8 Max distance: 3.1
Public 0.9 96.8 2.1 0.9 97.6 1.3 Max distance,
2 × 2: 1.2
Unemp. 29.8 7.4 62.6 32.1 8.2 59.5
Five-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 19.5; Median distance: 1.9
Max distance, 2 × 2: 1.9; Median distance,
2 × 2: 1.8
Table 11
Italy: ﬁt to job mobility data.
Observed Predicted
State at
t–1
State at t State at t
↓ Private Public Unemp. Private Public Unemp.
Private 94.9 1.5 3.5 96.1 1.6 2.2 Max distance: 4.3
Public 5.3 93.0 1.6 5.1 93.8 1.0 Max distance,
2 × 2: 1.2
Unemp. 18.4 3.3 78.2 21.3 4.7 73.9
Five-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 13.0; Median distance: 2.9
Max distance, 2 × 2: 6.9; Median distance,
2 × 2: 3.8
Table 12
Spain: ﬁt to job mobility data.
Observed Predicted
State
at t–1
State at t State at t
↓ Private Public Unemp. Private Public Unemp.
Private 92.0 1.4 6.4 93.4 1.7 4.8 Max distance: 5.6
Public 8.3 88.1 3.5 9.2 88.1 2.5 Max distance,
2 × 2: 1.4
Unemp. 32.6 3.6 63.7 37.0 4.8 58.1
Five-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 7.0; Median distance: 2.8
Max distance, 2 × 2: 3.6; Median distance,
2 × 2: 2.1
Table 7
Class composition of the sectors, real and simulated.
Observed Predicted
% of sample % of sample % km = 1 % km = 2 % km = 3
Germany
Private 71.19 71.66 14.27 80.56 5.17
Public 18.05 18.11 9.00 0.00 91.00
Unemp. 10.76 10.23 63.02 30.64 6.34
100.00 100.00
Netherlands
Private 72.46 72.57 5.23 94.77 –
Public 22.07 21.57 100.00 0.00 –
Unemp. 5.46 5.86 67.70 32.30 –
100.00 100.00
France
Private 62.39 63.90 78.87 21.13 –
Public 25.20 23.96 88.45 11.55 –
Unemp. 12.41 12.14 5.63 94.37 –
100.00 100.00
Italy
Private 58.33 58.01 3.31 67.80 28.89
Public 19.31 19.33 4.96 83.72 11.32
Unemp. 22.36 22.66 34.15 22.83 43.03
100.00 100.00
Spain
Private 62.65 62.14 1.33 85.15 13.53
Public 14.29 14.23 96.69 0.00 3.31
Unemp. 23.07 23.63 4.86 31.02 64.12
100.00 100.00
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Table 14
Netherlands: ﬁt to wage mobility data.
Observed Predicted
Earnings quintile at t Earnings quintile at t
Earnings
quintile
at t–5
63:3 23:8 8:6 1:6 2:4
25:0 45:0 21:4 7:5 1:0
3:9 31:5 44:8 14:9 4:6
1:9 5:1 24:9 53:0 14:8
0:0 0:6 2:3 22:4 74:4
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
68:3 22:5 6:6 1:6 0:8
20:4 45:1 24:6 7:8 1:7
5:8 22:7 39:9 24:9 6:4
1:9 7:1 25:2 43:7 21:8
0:6 2:4 3:5 22:0 71:2
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
Max. dist.:
10.0
One-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 6.6, median distance: 0.5
Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 15
France: ﬁt to wage mobility data.
Observed Predicted
Earnings quintile at t Earnings quintile at t
Earnings
quintile
at t–5
64:3 25:7 7:2 2:5 0:0
18:8 49:3 27:4 3:4 0:8
3:9 18:9 46:2 24:5 6:3
1:7 7:0 15:7 55:7 19:7
1:2 1:6 3:7 15:6 77:6
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
62:4 25:2 7:5 3:4 1:2
21:9 42:3 25:8 7:5 2:2
5:4 23:8 41:6 23:9 5:1
2:8 5:7 20:7 49:2 21:4
0:7 1:4 4:6 18:7 74:3
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
Max. dist.:
7.0
One-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 5.7, median distance: 0.9
Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 13
Germany: ﬁt to wage mobility data.
Observed Predicted
Earnings quintile at t Earnings quintile at t
Earnings
quintile
at t–5
63:9 21:1 7:9 4:2 2:7
26:3 41:4 21:6 8:2 2:2
7:0 28:1 40:0 21:0 3:7
2:9 9:0 27:2 44:2 16:5
0:5 1:6 3:0 17:1 77:5
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
53:7 24:2 11:1 7:3 3:5
23:8 35:9 23:7 12:4 3:9
10:2 22:3 35:4 24:3 7:5
7:2 12:9 22:7 36:6 20:4
2:9 5:3 7:3 20:7 63:6
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
Max. dist.:
13.9
One-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 7.7, median distance: 1.7
Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
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Table 17
Spain: ﬁt to wage mobility data.
Observed Predicted
Earnings quintile at t Earnings quintile at t
Earnings
quintile
at t–5
43:1 34:8 13:7 6:8 1:3
21:0 39:2 28:2 10:1 1:2
8:7 20:5 37:6 26:2 6:8
1:7 9:1 16:4 48:0 24:5
0:0 1:0 2:1 17:2 79:4
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
47:0 25:4 17:6 6:1 3:8
24:2 32:1 22:5 15:2 5:8
11:6 26:0 28:9 23:9 9:4
6:1 11:1 25:6 33:2 23:8
1:8 2:7 9:3 24:7 61:3
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
Max. dist.:
18.1
One-year transition matrices ﬁt: Max distance: 10.9, median distance: 2.5
Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
Table 16
Italy: ﬁt to wage mobility data.
Observed Predicted
Earnings quintile at t Earnings quintile at t
Earnings
quintile
at t–5
42:3 29:9 15:3 8:1 4:2
22:0 36:5 21:6 15:6 4:0
10:1 29:5 30:1 21:2 8:8
5:8 11:2 20:0 40:7 22:1
1:6 4:6 6:6 24:7 62:3
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
46:6 27:2 14:5 8:3 3:1
22:6 31:5 23:8 14:5 7:4
11:3 21:6 30:7 23:7 12:4
5:7 12:9 21:9 34:5 24:8
2:6 6:2 10:4 23:2 57:4
0BBBB@
1CCCCA
Max. dist.:
7.9
One-year transition matrices ﬁt Max distance: 4.5, median distance: 1.1
Note: earnings quintiles from the unconditional sample distribution.
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Cross-sectional earnings and job loss differences.
Whole sample Whole sample, with selection
Private Public Difference Private Public Difference
Germany Mean 8.43 8.41 − 0.02 8.43 8.47 0.04 ∗
Std. dev 0.32 0.29 − 0.03 ∗ 0.32 0.28 − 0.04 ∗
Auto-cov 0.85 0.86 0.01 0.85 0.87 0.02
Returns to exp 0.04 0.09 0.05 ∗ 0.03 0.08 0.05 ∗
Job loss rate 0.08 0.10 0.03§ 0.07 0.04 − 0.03 ∗
Netherlands Mean 8.69 8.65 − 0.04§ 8.67 8.76 0.09 ∗
Std. dev 0.27 0.21 − 0.05 ∗ 0.27 0.22 − 0.05 ∗
Auto-cov 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.90 0.91 0.01
Returns to exp 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.10 − 0.01
Job loss rate 0.03 0.01 − 0.02 0.02 0.01 − 0.00
France Mean 9.37 9.40 0.03§ 9.36 9.49 0.13 ∗
Std. dev 0.32 0.30 − 0.02 0.32 0.31 − 0.02
Auto-cov 0.87 0.89 0.02 0.87 0.90 0.03
Returns to exp 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.01
Job loss rate 0.05 0.04 − 0.01 0.04 0.02 − 0.02 ∗
Italy Mean 7.90 7.94 0.04 ∗ 7.91 8.03 0.12 ∗
Std. dev 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00
Auto-cov 0.77 0.82 0.05 # 0.77 0.83 0.06 ∗
Returns to exp 0.12 0.05 − 0.06 ∗ 0.10 0.04 − 0.06 ∗
Job loss rate 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.02 − 0.02 ∗
Spain Mean 12.20 12.30 0.11 ∗ 12.21 12.47 0.26 ∗
Std. dev 0.36 0.30 − 0.05 # 0.35 0.32 − 0.03
Auto-cov 0.77 0.80 0.03 0.77 0.83 0.06
Returns to exp 0.18 0.14 − 0.04 0.16 0.13 − 0.03
Job loss rate 0.12 0.10 − 0.02 0.07 0.03 − 0.04 ∗
UK Mean 7.41 7.44# 0.03 7.42 7.50 0.09 ∗
Std. dev 0.38 0.34 − 0.04§ 0.39 0.35 − 0.04§
Auto-cov 0.83 0.88 0.05 0.83 0.88 0.06
Returns to exp 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.14 0.13 − 0.01
Job loss rate 0.05 0.03 − 0.02 0.04 0.02 − 0.01§
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. * p b 0.01, § p b 0.05, # p b 0.10.
Table 20
Public premia in (log) lifetime values and (log) wages.
Whole sample Whole sample, with selection
Private Public Difference Private Public Difference
Germany
Lifetime Value mean 11.25 11.26 0.01 11.25 11.30 0.05 ∗
Std. dev. 0.36 0.33 − 0.03§ 0.36 0.34 − 0.02
Wage mean 8.40 8.37 − 0.03§ 8.40 8.45 0.05 ∗
Std. dev. 0.32 0.29 − 0.03 ∗ 0.32 0.29 − 0.04 ∗
Netherlands
Lifetime value mean 11.52 11.51 − 0.01 11.50 11.56 0.06§
Std. dev. 0.33 0.30 − 0.04 ∗ 0.33 0.31 − 0.02
Wage mean 8.67 8.63 − 0.04§ 8.66 8.75 0.09 ∗
Std. dev. 0.27 0.21 − 0.05 ∗ 0.27 0.22 − 0.05 ∗
France
Lifetime value mean 12.21 12.27 0.06 ∗ 12.19 12.31 0.13 ∗
Std. dev. 0.42 0.40 − 0.02 0.42 0.41 − 0.01
Wage mean 9.34 9.37 0.03 # 9.34 9.47 0.13 ∗
Std. dev. 0.32 0.30 − 0.02 0.32 0.30 − 0.02
Italy
Lifetime value mean 10.75 10.75 0.00 10.71 10.77 0.06 ∗
Std. dev. 0.28 0.29 0.01 # 0.28 0.32 0.04 ∗
Wage mean 7.87 7.91 0.04 ∗ 7.90 8.02 0.12 ∗
Std. dev. 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00
Spain
Lifetime value mean 15.14 15.21 0.07§ 15.10 15.34 0.24 ∗
Std. dev. 0.38 0.37 − 0.02 0.38 0.38 − 0.01
Wage mean 12.15 12.26 0.11 ∗ 12.18 12.46 0.28 ∗
Std. dev. 0.35 0.30 − 0.05 0.35 0.32 − 0.02
UK
Lifetime value mean 10.25 10.26 0.01 10.25 10.29 0.04
Std. dev. 0.38 0.38 − 0.00 0.38 0.37 − 0.02
Wage mean 7.38 7.42 0.04 # 7.39 7.49 0.09 ∗
Std. dev. 0.38 0.34 − 0.04§ 0.39 0.35 − 0.04§
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. * p b 0.01, § p b 0.05, # p b 0.10.
Table A-1
Sample attrition by country.
Germany Neth. France Italy Spain
% of initial sample remaining at year 5 87.6 86.0 75.0 84.2 82.5
% of initial sample remaining at year 8 57.0 51.4 40.4 47.6 49.2
% of attriting individuals due to gap in
responses
5.3 5.3 19.8 8.5 8.2
Table B-1
Education breakdown by country.
Germany Neth. France Italy Spain
Education level % % % % %
“high” 28.8 25.1 27.1 10.6 33.0
“medium” 60.3 54.2 44.3 49.5 24.1
“low” 10.9 20.7 28.6 39.9 42.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 19
Public premia (log points) in lifetime values and wages, selected percentiles of the distribution.
Whole sample Whole sample, with selection
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Germany Lifetime Value 4.95 0.57 − 2.22 8.11 ∗ 5.23 ∗ 3.52
Wage − 0.73 − 3.20§ − 5.33 ∗ 8.13 ∗ 4.45 ∗ 2.85
Netherlands Lifetime Value 3.54 − 1.31 − 5.09§ 7.97§ 6.18 ∗ 3.43
Wage − 0.23 − 2.97 − 8.69 ∗ 10.99 ∗ 9.80 ∗ 5.73 ∗
France Lifetime Value 9.05 ∗ 5.69 ∗ 3.10 13.47 ∗ 12.92 ∗ set(2.84)11.22 ∗
Wage 3.96 # 2.87 # 1.31 13.20 ∗ 12.60 ∗ 12.99 ∗
Italy Lifetime Value − 1.87 0.25 2.29 0.48 4.21 # 15.30 ∗
Wage 7.84 ∗ 3.66 ∗ 2.24 12.50 ∗ 11.35 ∗ 14.62 ∗
Spain Lifetime Value 8.45§ 7.17 # 4.73 21.74 ∗ 26.52 ∗ rset(3.60)21.04 ∗
Wage 17.67 ∗ 10.90 ∗ 4.60 31.44 ∗ 28.42 ∗ 23.80 ∗
UK Lifetime Value 0.53 1.06 0.52 8.35 # 3.84 2.52
Wage 7.07§ 3.95§ − 0.96 14.49 ∗ 9.51 ∗ 3.24
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. * p b 0.01, § p b 0.05, # p b 0.10.
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As outlined in Section 4.2 there is some attrition from the sample for
each country, which we assume exogenous. Some of the attrition is a
result of our sample selection rules in which an individual is considered
censored from the ﬁrst time that they have a gap in their response
history. The table below shows the extent of attrition in each sample,after 4 years and after 7 years and the proportion of individuals who
are censored because of a gap in their response history:Appendix B. Education breakdown by country“High” education refers to ISCED levels 5–7, corresponding to any
tertiary level education. “Medium” level education refers to ISCED
level 3 and corresponds to upper-secondary (i.e. post-compulsory)
level schooling, whilst “low” education refers to ISCED levels 0–2 and
represents levels of education up to the end of compulsory (secondary)
school. We can see from the table that for Germany, the Netherlands,
France and Spain the proportion of “high” educated individuals is of a
similar order of magnitude, however Italy has a considerably smaller
proportion of individuals in the top educated bracket. As the ECHP sur-
veys are designed to be the same in each country and the education cod-
ing is a standard international classiﬁcation, this should be reﬂecting
genuine differences in educational composition of each sample. Ideally
the proportion with “high” education would approximately similar in
each country, which is not the case, primarily due to Italy. An alternative
strategywould be to capture human capital differences via occupational
classiﬁcation. The ECHP contains the International Standard Classiﬁca-
tion of Occupation (ISCO-88) 1-digit level classiﬁcation for individual's
occupations. The 1-digit ISCO-88 classiﬁcation assigns occupations to
one of 9 categories, from 1 “Legislators, senior ofﬁcials, managers”,
through 5 “Service workers and shop and market sales workers”, to 9
31 In the Netherlands and France there is no sufﬁcient movement between sectors to al-
low the interaction of experience and previous state to be estimated accurately, moreover
in France the education dummies are insigniﬁcant and so in the interests of parsimony are
dropped.
32 Again the unobservedmobility heterogeneity class kim can only alter the constant term
in each equation, and for the initial states we do not allow interactions of experiencewith
previous state.
159M. Dickson et al. / Labour Economics 31 (2014) 141–161“Elementary occupations”. Attempts to combine these gradings into 3
broad levels of human capital attainment, that would result in similar
proportions of individuals at each level in each country, were unsuc-
cessful. As a consequence, though dividing individuals according to
the 3 category education variable does not result in absolute symmetry
across countries, it is more satisfactory than the possible alternative
human capital measures based on occupational classiﬁcation.
Appendix C. Model speciﬁcation
In this appendix we describe in full detail the functional form as-
sumptions of the model. To refresh the notation and basic structure of
the statistical model: each country's sample is a set of N workers
indexed i = 1, …, N, each of whom is followed over Ti consecutive
years. A typical individual observation i is a vector xi=(yi, ei, pubi, ziv, zif),
to which we append a pair of unobserved class indexes, ki = (kim, kiy).
As outlined in Section 5 of the main body, there are three components
to individual i's contribution to the complete likelihood (Eq. (1)),
referring respectively to unobserved heterogeneity, labour market
status history and earnings history. Belowwe set out the full speciﬁca-
tion of each of these components. The choice of covariates to be in-
cluded in each component was informed not only by the descriptive
analysis of Section 4, but also by a concern for numerical tractability,
parsimony and the aim to get as close as possible to estimating the
same model speciﬁcation for each of the countries.
C.1. Unobserved heterogeneity
As outlined in Eq. (2), the attachment of individual i to a given latent
class ki= (kim, kiy) is modelled as the product of two terms: ‘i(ki|zif) =
Pr{kiy|kim, zif} ⋅ Pr{kim|zif}, which are both speciﬁed as multinomial logits:
Pr kmi ¼ kmjz fi
n o
¼
exp zfi
0  κmkm
 
XKm
k¼1exp z
f
i
0  κmk
  and
Pr kyi jkmi ; z fi
n o
¼
exp z
f
i
kmi
 !0
 κyky
" #
XKy
k¼1exp
zfi
kmi
 !0
 κyk
" #
;
ðC1Þ
where κ1m and κ1y are both normalised at zero.
C.2. Labour market states
Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) established that the individual labour market
histories contribute to the complete likelihood as:
‘i Sijzvi ; z fi ; kmi
 
¼ Pr Si1jzfi ; kmi
n o
 ∏
Ti
t¼2
Pr Sit jSi;t−1; zvi;t−1; zfi ; kmi
n o
; ðC2Þ
We can express this rather in terms of the indicator variables eit and
pubit as:
‘i

ei;pubijzvi ; z fi ; kmi Þ ¼ Pr ei1jz fi ; kmi
n o
 Pr pubi1jz fi ; kmi
n oh ieit
∏
Ti
t¼2

Pr eitjei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n o
 Pr pubit jei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n oh ieit Þ:
ðC3ÞAs alluded to in Subsection (5.3), each component is speciﬁed as a
logit. Allowing Λ(x) = (1 + e−x)−1 to designate the logistic cdf:
Pr eitjei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Λ ei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1 0; z f
0
i ; k
m0
i
h i
 ψ
 
;
Pr pubit jei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1; z fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Λ ei;t−1;pubi;t−1; zvi;t−1 0; z f
0
i ; k
m0
i
h i
 χ
 
;
ðC4Þ
We allow the unobserved mobility heterogeneity class kim to affect
the unemployment and public sector probabilities only through alter-
ing the constant terms in the respective logits. This is because the
number of observed sector transitions is not sufﬁcient in the sample
for most of the countries to allow less restrictive speciﬁcations –
such as allowing this unobserved class to interact with experience or
education – to be estimated. However, where possible (Germany,
Italy, Spain) we do allow the effect of experience to interact with
previous state.31 For the initial job state probabilities, we use similar
speciﬁcations32:
Pr ei1jz fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Λ z f
0
i ; k
m0
i
h i
 ψ0
 
and Pr pubi1jz fi ; kmi
n o
¼ Λ z f
0
i ; k
m0
i
h i
 χ0
 
ðC5Þ
C.3. Earnings
As the exposition in the main body text Section (4) details much of
the modelling of earnings trajectories, what remains for this appendix
is to set out the set of functions {μ(⋅), σ(⋅), τ1(⋅) and τ2(⋅)} introduced
in Eqs. (7) and (9). Recall from Section (4) that only individuals who are
employed at date-t have earnings information available at date-t, there-
fore eit=1 for all observations used to estimate the μ(⋅), and indeed the
σ(⋅) function, and as such eit is not an argument of either function.
Starting with μ(⋅), we posit that:
μ pubit ; ei;t−1; z
v
it ; z
f
i ; k
y
i
 
¼ z
f
i
ei;t−1
" #0
μ0 þ zvit  pubit

 0μ1
þ kyi  zvit

 0μ2 þ kyi  pubit
 μ3; ðC6Þ
where the notation x ∗ y stands for all of the main effects and interac-
tions of variables x and y, and x ⋅ y stands for the single interaction
term between x and y. Thus the speciﬁcation of the u(⋅) function allows
the effect of experience to differ across job sectors andwage classes, and
the public sector effect is also allowed to vary with wage class. Previous
period unemployment and time-invariant heterogeneity can affect the
intercept only.
Turning to the log earnings variance function, we specify:
σ pubit; ei;t−1; z
v
it ; k
y
i
 
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
exp
zvit
pubit
ei;t−1
kyi
2664
3775
0
 σ0
0BB@
1CCA
vuuuuut : ðC7Þ
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restrictive than we allow for the earnings means. Speciﬁcally we do
not include the time-invariant observed individual characteristics zif
amongst the arguments of σ(⋅), thus we allow them to inﬂuence earn-
ings variance only through their link to the time-invariant wage class,
ki
y. Moreover, we do not allow interactions of the wage class with any
of the other arguments. Given the relatively small sample sizes avail-
able, and some experimentation with allowing some interactions, be-
tween for example kiy and pubit, we ﬁnd this speciﬁcation to provide
the best ﬁt for all of the countries in the data. Note that by specifying
it as an exponential, we force the log earnings variance to be positive.
Finally, we come to the speciﬁcation of the earnings dynamics,
which are governed by the functions τ1(⋅) and τ2(⋅). Again recall that
earnings at date-t are only available for individuals in employment at
that date and therefore eit = 1 and ei,t − 1 = 1 for all observations
contributing to the estimation of the τ1(⋅) function and as such are
not arguments of the function. The ﬁrst-order auto-correlation of
earnings, τ1(⋅), is posited as:
τ1 pubit;pubi;t−1; z
v
it ; z
f
i ; k
y
i
 
¼−1þ 2  Λ
z fit
zvit
pubit
pubi;t−1
0BBB@
1CCCA  kyi
26664
37775
0
 ζ0
8>><>>:
9>>=>>;:
ðC8Þ
This speciﬁcation requires some clariﬁcation. Firstly, the transforma-
tion− 1 + 2 ⋅ Λ(⋅) which we apply to a linear index in the explanatory
variables is there to constrain τ1(⋅), which is a correlation coefﬁcient, to
lie within [−1, + 1]. Second, as with the speciﬁcation of σ(⋅) function,
the number of interactions amongst the covariates is limited to allowing
different impacts of each covariate depending on the wage class. This
speciﬁcationwas decided upon following numerous trials involving dif-
ferent speciﬁcations with various interactions permitted. The ﬁnding
was that the vast increase in computation time that this entailed for
each country, did not bring any clear beneﬁt in terms of greater preci-
sion of theﬁt, thus the currentmore parsimonious speciﬁcationwas set-
tled upon.
The correlation between normalised log earnings and normalised
log earnings lagged twice, τ2(⋅), is more complex. First let us recall the
notation introduced in Section 4's Eq. (9),for the one- and two-lag auto-
correlations of earnings at date-t:
τi;t;t−1 ¼ τ1 pubit;pubi;t−1; zvit ; z fi ; kyi
 
and τi;t;t−2 ¼ τ2 pubit ;pubi;t−1;pubi;t−2; zvit; zfi ; kyi
 
:
Now we write:
τ2 pubit;pubi;t−1;pubi;t−2; z
v
it ; z
f
i ; k
y
i
 
¼ τi;t;t−1  τi;t−1;t−2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−τ2i;t;t−1
 
 1−τ2i;t−1;t−2
 r 	
 eτ2 kyi ;
ðC9Þ
with eτ2 kyi  ¼−1þ 2  Λ ky0i  ξ  simply speciﬁed as a wage class-
speciﬁc constant within [−1, + 1]. Note that τi,t − 1,t − 2 is simply the
ﬁrst lag of τi,t,t − 1.
These latter equations require some comments. Firstly, we have
to constrain τ2(⋅) in such a way that, given τi,t,t − 1 and τi,t − 1,t − 2, the
matrix:
τ 3ð Þit ¼
1 τi;t;t−1 τi;t;t−2
τi;t;t−1 1 τi;t−1;t−2
τi;t;t−2 τi;t−1;t−2 1
0@ 1A
is a consistent covariance matrix. This is the case provided that its
determinant Δit is positive (and that the various τ's lie in [−1, + 1]).Δit is deﬁned by Δit = 1 − τi,t,t − 12 − τi,t − 1,t − 22 − τi,t,t − 22 +
2τi,t,t − 1τi,t − 1,t − 2τi,t,t − 2. Solving for τi,t,t − 2, we get:
τi;t;t−2 ¼ τi;t;t−1  τi;t−1;t−2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−τ2i;t;t−1
 
 1−τ2i;t−1;t−2
 
−Δit
r
: ðC10Þ
Because Δit is positive, τi,t,t − 2 has to stay within the interval"
τi;t;t−1  τi;t−1;t−2−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−τ2i;t;t−1
 
 1−τ2i;t−1;t−2
 r
; τi;t;t−1  τi;t−1;t−2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−τ2i;t;t−1
 
 1−τ2i;t−1;t−2
 r #
:
This is achieved by the parameterization in Eq. (C9) given the
constraint eτ2 ð Þ∈ −1;þ1½ .
C.4. Derivation of the likelihood of earnings trajectory
From Eq. (6) and as a consequence of our assumption of a second-
order Markov process for individual earnings (omitting the individual
i index and the conditioning variables), we have, for individuals with
three consecutive data points on income:
‘ yð Þ ¼ ‘ y2; y1ð Þ  ∏
T
t¼3
‘ yt jyt−1; yt−2ð Þ ¼ ‘ y2; y1ð Þ  ∏
T
t¼3
‘ yt ; yt−1; yt−2ð Þ
‘ yt−1; yt−2ð Þ
:
ðC11Þ
Each term in this expression can be written as a joint density of a
triple or a pair of normalised log-earnings, eyit ¼ yit−μ itσ it :
‘ yt ; yt−1; yt−2ð Þ ¼ 1σ tσ t−1σ t−2  φ3ðeyt ;eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 3ð Þt Þ
‘ yt ; yt−1ð Þ ¼ 1σ tσ t−1  φ2 eyt ;eyt−1; τ 2ð Þt
 
So the likelihood of an earning trajectory becomes:
‘ yð Þ ¼ 1
σ1σ2
 φ2 ey2;ey1; τ 2ð Þ2   ∏T
t¼3
φ3 eyt ;eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 3ð Þt 
φ2 eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 2ð Þt−1   ∏
T
t¼3
1
σ t
 
¼ ∏
T
t¼1
1
σ t
 

φ2 ey2;ey1; τ 2ð Þ2   ∏T
t¼3
φ3 eyt ;eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 3ð Þt 
φ2 ey2;ey1; τ 2ð Þ2   ∏T
t¼4
φ2 eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 2ð Þt−1 
¼ ∏
T
t¼1
1
σ t
 

∏
T
t¼3
φ3 eyt ;eyt−1;eyt−2; τ 3ð Þt 
∏
T−1
t¼3
φ2 eyt ;eyt−1; τ 2ð Þt :
ðC12Þ
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